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POLICY, AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY AND MISALLOCATION 
 
This dissertation explores the effects of factors such as industrial policy and 
listing on the stock market on manufacturing firms’ profitability and productivity. 
The second chapter investigates the effect of industrial policies on misallocation 
using a rich data-set of Chinese firms. Using a difference-in-difference approach, I 
provide evidence that government policies (i.e. the 10th Five Year Plan) favoring 
particular industries lead to increased misallocation (i.e., an increase in the dispersion 
of revenue productivity across firms in four-digit industries). Moreover, the differential 
changes between industries supported and not supported by the 10th Five Year Plan are 
quantitatively large and indicative of a substantial negative impact on aggregate TFP. 
Using a changes-in-changes model, I find evidence that the Five Year Plan had a 
positive and significant effect for most of the TFPR distribution while the effect was 
negative for the lowest quintile of TFPQ and positive for the highest TFPQ quintile. 
The results suggest increased misallocation is related to the way in which the Chinese 
government doled out support through the increase of subsidies and the improvement 
of credit conditions for a subset of firms. 
In the third chapter, I study the heterogeneous effects of an industrial policy -
the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation, profitability and real technology in Chinese 
provinces with different mix of supported intensities. I find that the 10th Five Year Plan 
increased misallocation, profitability and technology of supported industries in 
provinces with higher supporting intensities. After controlling the effects of China’s 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms and joining into World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the results are still robust and consistent. 
In the fourth chapter, I investigate the effects of listing on the stock market on 
firm’s profitability and technology. Using Chinese firm level data, I identify listing 
firms, and compute revenue productivity and physical productivity to measure 
profitability and technology, respectively. To deal with the endogenous problem of 
listing, I use the number of investment banks as instrument variable. With a difference-
in-difference model, I find that listing increases firm’s profitability and technology. 
Empirical findings also reveal that listing changes characteristics of firms, such as asset, 
 
 
liability and capital structure. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Misallocation will affect the differences in living standards between rich and poor 
countries by lowering aggregate productivity. When labor and capital are not put to 
their best or most efficient use, total production is, quite obviously, lower. Government 
industrial policy can influence productivity across firms and misallocation across 
industries. In the second chapter, I focus on the effects of government policy on 
misallocation.  
As to government policy, I focus on the most important industrial policy in China, the 
Five Year Plan, to examine the effects of the Plan on misallocation. The Five Year Plans 
are made by the central government every 5 years to guide economic and investment 
activities. I use the 10th Five Year Plan because the data is from 1998 to 2005, and the 
10th Five Year Plan is from 2001 to 2005. The official document allows us to match 
narrowly defined supported industries with the corresponding 4-digit industry code. As 
to why are these industries supported, we could not be able to infer all the reasons. For 
example, the Plan intended to improve socialist, spiritual civilization, ensure stability, 
and so on. 
I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to measure misallocation, which misallocation is 
measured by the variance of revenue productivity. Revenue productivity should be 
equal across firms within industry. Therefore, the smaller of the variance of revenue 
productivity, the higher of total factor productivity of the industry.  
The data used in the chapter is from the Annual Surveys of Chinese Manufacturing 
from 1998 to 2005. It includes all state-owned and non-state-owned firms with nominal 
revenues exceeding 5 million yuan. The number of observations ranges from about 
165,000 in 1998 to 269,000 in 2005. I used firm’s value-added, wage payments, and 
capital stock to compute revenue productivity and misallocation. 
With a difference-in-difference approach, I test the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on 
misallocation. I find that the 10th Five Year Plan increases misallocation of supported 
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industries, which in specific the 10th Five Year Plan increases misallocation by around 
6.4% after 2000. Moreover, empirical results show that the Five Year Plan increases 
profitability of supported industries, but has no significant effects on technology of 
supported industries. As profitability is equal to price times technology, which means 
the Five Year Plan only increases the markup of supported industries. 
I further examine the heterogeneous effects of the Five Year Plan on the distributions 
of revenue and physical productivity. The results show that the Five Year Plan increases 
firm’s revenue productivity at most distributions, but only have negative effects on 
technology of firms at the bottom percentiles, and positive effects on technology of 
firms at the top percentiles, which one possible reason is that the governments support 
firms with lower technology level to keep them survive. In addition, I investigate the 
mechanism of how does the Five Year Plan work on misallocation. Starting with the 
three most commonly used methods by government, which they are tax reduction, 
subsidy and access to credit, I find evidence that the Five Year Plan increases 
misallocation by direct subsidies and better credit condition. 
I take a new approach by focusing on the unequal effects of industrial policy across 
provinces in the third chapter. A large and growing literature has investigated the effects 
of industrial policies on economic outcomes such as growth and productivity. However, 
the effects of the same industrial policy might vary across different regions. Using 
Chinese manufacturing firm-level data, I examine whether there are unequal effects of 
the most important industrial policy in China, the Five Year Plan, on misallocation, 
profitability and real technology. 
Consistent with chapter 2, I use the variance of revenue productivity within an industry 
to measure misallocation, revenue productivity to measure profitability and physical 
productivity to measure technology. As local governments are the executors of the 
industrial policy, local governments might support the targeting industries differently 
due to different economic status of the supported industries. I introduce supporting 
intensity, which it is the share of value-added of supported industries in a province to 
denote supporting intensity in that province, to capture the difference of the same 
industrial policy across provinces in China. Using a difference-in-difference model, I 
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confirm the findings of the former chapter. Industrial policy increases misallocation and 
profitability. However, the Five Year Plan has a positive effect on the technology levels 
of provinces with higher supporting intensities. 
I address the question what changes do listing on a stock market bring to firms’ 
productivity and profitability in the fourth chapter. However, the decision to be listed 
on the stock market for firms can be endogenous due to reverse causality and 
unobserved variables. I use the number of investment bank in a city as the instrument 
variable to tackle the endogenous effects. The number of investment banks in a city has 
no correlation with firms’ profitability or technology except via listing.  
The data about firm’s information is from Chinese firm-level data from the Annual 
Surveys of Industrial Production, and the information about listing is from WIND data 
base. With propensity score match method and a difference-in-difference model, I find 
that listing on a stock exchange increases firm’s profitability and technology. The 
results are consistent after controlling for the geographic effects and SOE reforms. 
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Chapter 2 Policy and Misallocation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A large and growing literature has argued that misallocation contributes substantially 
to the differences in living standards between rich and poor countries 1. When labor and 
capital are not put to their best or most efficient use, total production is, quite obviously, 
lower. Misallocation can happen for a variety reasons including constraints on factor 
mobility from financial frictions or employment restrictions, taxes or trade policy, or 
the government explicitly fostering certain industries for political or other reasons. Our 
analysis concerns the last of these: direct government intervention. 
We provide evidence that government policies favoring particular industries or firms 
lead to misallocation. In particular, we estimate the effect of China's Five Year Plans 
using micro-level data on Chinese firms. The misallocation of resources within 
industries supported by the 10th Five Year Plan increases relative to not supported 
industries. We measure misallocation as the dispersion of revenue productivity (price 
times total factor productivity) across firms in an industry; the differential changes in 
this dispersion for supported industries versus not supported industries is quantitatively 
large, indicating that this type of misallocation is important for understanding 
productivity differences both within and across countries. 
Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the central government has 
controlled economic activity by making explicit policies to direct the deployment of 
resources. The plans are usually updated every five years. Although almost all countries 
have some policies favoring certain firms or industries, China's economy-wide re-
shuffling of economic priorities makes for a poignant case study. We use information 
from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production, which contains data on Chinese firms 
from 1998 to 2005, to estimate the misallocation due to the centralized planning in 
                                                   
1 See Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) and the many papers cited within. 
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China. The survey covers a large sample of firms included in the manufacturing 
industries that were the target of the 10th Five Year Plan, and it also includes industries 
that were neither targeted by this plan, nor by the 9th Five Year Plan. Hence, the data is 
well-suited to our needs, as it allows us to identify the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan 
by comparing differences in misallocation between supported and not supported 
industries. 
Our work is closely related to that of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) who use the same data 
to quantify productivity losses from misallocation in China (and India) relative to the 
United States. We build from the empirical approach developed in Hsieh and Klenow; 
however, our analysis is more disaggregated and seeks to answer a question only 
tangentially addressed in their paper. Whereas Hsieh and Klenow focus on the degree 
of misallocation across all manufacturing firms in China, we estimate the increase in 
misallocation within the specific industries supported by the Five Year Plan. In this 
sense, we provide the details, or a concrete very large example (the Five Year Plan), of 
how the country-wide misallocation documented by Hsieh and Klenow may result from 
a particular policy intervention. However, as we will explain below, we depart from 
Hsieh and Klenow in that we exploit the firm-level data to investigate the distributional 
effect of the Five Year Plan on productivity. We believe that tracing the effects out to 
the firm-level and mapping the cause to specific policies are important contributions. 
The literature has debated whether the type of country-wide comparisons used by Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009) really measure misallocation or instead capture other differences 
between countries. Our empirical strategy and results are consistent with the 
misallocation interpretation, lending strong support to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 2. 
To measure misallocation, we calculate revenue productivity (the product of physical 
productivity and a firm's output price) for each firm. In the absence of firm-level 
distortions, according to the theory laid out in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), revenue 
productivity will be equated across firms. In other words, capital and labor will be 
employed where their marginal value is highest. If, instead, there exists dispersion in 
                                                   
2 We use the term `misallocation' as defined broadly and to include resource misallocation, as well 
as other sources of misallocation. 
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the revenue productivity across a set of firms, then this dispersion indicates the degree 
to which distortions are keeping capital and labor from finding their most efficient uses. 
These distortions mean that resources are misallocated, which lowers both total factor 
productivity (TFP) and the total output produced by a given set of inputs. Thus, we use 
the variance of total revenue productivity (the dispersion of TFPR) across firms in an 
industry as our primary measure of misallocation. 
The data allow us to categorize firms into industries according to the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics classification codes. We use codes at the finest (4-digit) level to 
group firms into highly disaggregated industries and calculate the variance of TFPR in 
each industry. Importantly, the official documents of the 9th and the 10th Five Year Plans 
enable us to distinguish which 4-digit industries each plan supported. Our empirical 
approach, then, is to use a difference-in-difference (DID) regression model to estimate 
the impact on the variance of TFPR. To identify policy effects, we compare differences 
in the variance of TFPR between industries newly supported by the 10th Five Year Plan 
and those industries receiving no support in either the 9th or 10th Five Year Plan. This 
DID approach offers several advantages. First, it fits well with our data, which consists 
of repeated cross-sections rather than a panel of firms. We can directly account for 
observed differences across industries and over time through a series of control 
variables, but the DID model also allows us to net out remaining differences in 
misallocation between supported and not supported industries, as well as to control for 
the aggregate upward trend in misallocation. We interpret the resulting regression 
estimates as evidence that the centralized plans increased misallocation, especially for 
the supported industries. Our results suggest that the Five Year Plan increased 
misallocation by at least 6 percent and probably by much more. This large and 
statistically significant impact on misallocation leads us to the second part of our paper 
- exploring how the policies worked to increase misallocation. 
We begin by showing that the average TFPR of firms in supported industries increased 
relative to firms in not supported industries, but average physical productivity (TFPQ) 
was unchanged. This finding suggests that the policies impacted average prices more 
than average productivity; however, both the full TFPR and TFPQ distributions 
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changed. In other words, the average effect masks heterogeneity across firms with 
different levels of TFPR and / or TFPQ. To show this, we deviate from Hsieh and 
Klenow and employ the firm-level data (rather than aggregating to the four-digit 
industry level as with the DID approach) to estimate the quantile treatment effect of the 
Five Year Plan on the supported firms. Specifically, we estimate the non-linear 
difference-in-difference model, commonly known as the changes-in-changes (CIC) 
model proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). This approach enables us to investigate 
how the policies affected the full TFPR and TFPQ distributions. The results indicate 
that the Five Year Plan had a positive and significant effect on most of the TFPR 
distribution, yet the quantile treatment effect is somewhat larger for the extreme right 
tail. As for the TFPQ distribution, the effect is negative and significant for the lower 
quintile (the least productive firms), positive and significant for the highest quintile, 
and insignificant for the middle quintiles. In short, while the implemented industrial 
policies caused the most productive firms to become more productive, firms in the 
extreme left tail of the distribution became even less productive. This set of results is 
consistent with the idea that the Five Year Plan tended to support large, low productivity 
firms, reducing their productivity even further. 
The heterogeneous effect on the distribution of TFPR and TFPQ, thus poses the 
question: what mechanisms were used by the Chinese government to promote the 
supported industries? After all, if increased dispersion in TFPR is a result of 
government policies, then we should be able to relate changes in the distribution of 
TFPR to explicit support mechanisms used by the government. To tackle this question, 
we first inquire whether the 10th Five Year Plan impacted the probability that firms in 
the supported industries would pay taxes, receive subsidies or pay/receive interest 
relative to the not supported firms. We also examine whether these policies affected the 
ratio of taxes to value added, the ratio of subsidies to value added, and the ratio of 
interest payments to debt. Second, we partition the firms into three groups according to 
the terciles of the TFPR distribution for each four-digit industry. Splitting the firms into 
groups allows us to examine whether the Five Year Plan had a heterogeneous effect on 
the three mechanisms commonly used to support firms, while still having a large 
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number of firms in each group. Intuitively, TFPR will increase more for firms that face 
larger disincentives in the form of higher taxes, worse credit conditions, or smaller 
subsides. Our estimation results suggest that the Chinese government doled out support 
to industries via direct subsidies and improved credit conditions. Moreover, the 
differential treatment in terms of the probability of receiving support through taxes and 
subsidies (as well as in the magnitude of the support) for different parts of the TFPR 
distribution suggest that the two mechanisms may have increased the wedge between 
the observed and the efficient level of TFPR and decreased aggregate TFP. As a result 
of the Five Year Plan, high-TFPR firms in supported industries experienced a relative 
increase in taxes; whereas the least productive firms received larger subsidies. The 10th 
Five Year Plan appears to have diverted resources away from high productive firms 
towards low productive firms, within the supported industries. 
Our results are in line with the theory and empirics from Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 
who find that distortions at the firm level, stemming from tax and subsidy policies, 
reduce aggregate productivity. In addition to the Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) papers, our work is related to several other studies on 
misallocation. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) use revenue and physical 
productivity to measure firm profitability. Melitz (2003) argues that capital 
misallocation results in lower total factor productivity growth. Song and Wu (2015) 
find that capital misallocation decreases output, and Alfaro et al. (2008) find that it 
results in lower income. Aghion et al. (2008) find the effects of industrial policy reform 
are unequal across Indian states because the labor market environments differ. Guner et 
al. (2008) also find the effects of policies on productivity vary due to different firm 
characteristics. Bartelsman et al. (2010) argue that firm size affects firm productivity. 
Finally, Dollar and Wei (2007) find that state-owned firms in China have lower 
efficiency. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 details how we use the firm-level data to 
measure misallocation and offers a brief overview of China's Five Year Plans. Section 
2.3 discusses the empirical strategy, presents our main empirical results as well as 
several robustness checks. Section 2.4 investigates the effect of the Five Year Plan on 
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average TFPR and TFPQ, tests whether the effects were heterogeneous across the TFPR 
and TFPQ distributions, and examines the mechanisms used to provide support. Section 
2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Industrial Policy, Measurement, and Data 
Our regressions exploit the variation in which industries were supported by China's 
Five Year Plans in order to estimate the policy's effect on the misallocation of resources. 
In this section, we first discuss the Five Year Plans and which industries received 
support. We then review the theory on how to measure misallocation. Finally, we detail 
the firm-level information used to compute misallocation by industry. 
2.2.1 China's Five Year Plans 
Many countries implement industrial policies aimed at encouraging the development 
and growth of certain industries. In China, these policies take the form of Five Year 
Plans developed by the State Council (the central Communist government). The 
Chinese central government issued the first Five Year Plan in 1953. The objective of 
the earlier Five Year Plans was to establish and promote different industries by making 
specific investments and establishing growth objectives for each particular industry. 
The first Five Year Plans sought to establish a variety of industries in China during a 
period when the economy was centrally controlled and closed. However, since the 
policy of "grasping the large and letting go of the small" was enacted in 1997, a 
movement towards privatization has taken place. Moreover, the Five Year Plans have 
shifted from delineating investment and growth objectives for each industry towards 
establishing macroeconomic objectives and identifying particular industries to 
strengthen. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the 10th Five Year Plan because its onset 
and implementation (2001-2005) are covered by the available data, which begins in 
1998. The general objectives, according to the Report on the Outline of the 10th Five 
Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2001), were as follows. 
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First, achieve an average economic growth rate of about 7%. Second, adjust 
development patterns across different industries and regions, as well as between urban 
and rural areas. This objective required strengthening agriculture, developing the 
service industry, and reinforcing infrastructure. Third, increase openness and prioritize 
the development of science, technology, and education. Fourth, raise living standards 
by creating more jobs, increasing personal income, making the income distribution 
more equitable, and improving the social security system. Lastly, coordinate sustainable 
economic, social, and environmental development. 
More specifically, the 10th Five Year Plan --as with all Five Year Plans-- lays out the 
industries (or whole sectors) to be supported over the following five years. The 
documentation thus allows us to match narrowly defined supported industries with the 
corresponding 4-digit industry code. For example, alumina manufacturing (3316), gas 
turbine manufacturing (3513), integrated circuit (4035), paper making (3641), and 
many others were specifically targeted for support. However, in several cases, the 10th 
Five Year Plan promotes the development of more broadly defined industries, such as 
‘plastic manufacturing’. In these cases, we treat the corresponding two-digit industry 
as supported. Industries supported in the 10th Five Year Plan cover a large number of 
establishments in agricultural products processing, textile, textile products processing, 
leather related products manufacturing, paper and paper products, chemical products, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, chemical fiber, rubber, plastic manufacturing, non-
metallic mineral products, ferrous and nonferrous metal smelting, transportation and 
electrical equipment, communications and computers, and instrumentation 
manufacturing. Yet, a large number of industries such as chemicals, rubber and plastics, 
and motor vehicles received no support. For the sake of brevity, we refer the reader to 
the Appendix for a complete list of supported industries. 
We conclude this section by noting that we are not able to infer all the reasons why 
some industries are featured in the 10th Five Year Plan from the available documentation. 
The stated justification is not only economic; the policies also were intended to 
"improve socialist, spiritual civilization, democracy and the legal system, balance 
reform, development and stability, accelerate development of various social 
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undertakings, and ensure social stability". Nevertheless, our hypothesis is that the 
resources used for supporting firms within an industry (however these industries were 
selected) are not necessarily put toward their most efficient use. Specific firms may 
receive support to accomplish any number of objectives and especially for political 
expediency. Moreover, while the policy is formulated at the national level, local party 
officials often decide which firms to target. In particular, as we will show, there appears 
to be a tendency for low productivity to receive subsidies. Thus, resources may be 
directed to less efficient firms in supported sectors, distorting certain industries. How 
much the Five Year Plans worsen (or improve) misallocation is an empirical question. 
2.2.2 Measuring Misallocation 
We measure misallocation based on the theory developed in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 
They posit that revenue productivity (TFPR), the product of physical productivity and 
output price, should be equal across firms in the absence of distortions. The intuition is 
as follows. If firms operating in the same industry have access to the same technology 
and face the same input (capital and labor) prices, then, in the absence of firm-level 
distortions, TFPR should be equalized across firms. Thus, the greater the dispersion in 
TFPR, the greater is the misallocation of resources 3. 
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we consider an environment of monopolistic 
competition. Each specific firm i in industry s produces differentiated output siY . Total 
industry output sY  is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of output 
from the sM  firms in the industry 
1 1
1
sM
s si
i
Y Y
σ
σ σ
σ
− −
=
 
=  
 
∑  
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within the industry's CES 
                                                   
3 The idea of using dispersion across firms to study misallocation also can be traced to Restuccia 
and Rogerson (2008). Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) first used physical productivity 
(TFPQ) and revenue productivity (TFPR) to study firm profitability. 
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aggregator. Each individual firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology 
1s s
si si si siY A K L
α α−=  
where siA  is the firm specific technology level, K is capital, L is labor, and the capital 
and labor shares ( sα ) are allowed to vary across industries. An individual firm's TFPR 
is given by 
1( )s s
si si
si si si
si si
P YTFPR P A
K wLα α−
= =  (2.1) 
where firm i sets price siP  and all firms face wage w  . Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 
provide further details on the model's economic environment and for the derivation of 
TFPR. We also examine total factor physical productivity (TFPQ). TFPR equals siP  
times TFPQ: 
1( )s s
si
si si
si si
YTFPQ A
K wLα α−
= =  (2.2) 
We take Equation (2.1) as the definition of firm specific TFPR, and we use the 
dispersion or variance of TFPR across firms in an industry as our measure of 
misallocation. Again, theoretically, there should be no dispersion in TFPR in the 
absence of distortions 4. 
Furthermore, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that industry specific total factor 
productivity (TFPs) can be written as 
1
1
1log log( ) var(log )
1 2
sM
s si si
i
TFP A TFPRσ σ
σ
−
=
= −
− ∑  (2.3) 
where the summation is over the sM   firms in industry s, σ is the elasticity of 
substitution, and var takes the variance across the logged TFPR of firms in the industry 5. 
                                                   
4 As noted in the Introduction, the literature has suggested other factors that could impact the 
dispersion of TFPR, which are not captured by this model and are not necessarily misallocation.  
See Feng (2018), for example. However, in our empirical approach below, we rely on differential 
changes in the dispersion of TFPR that are unlikely to affected by any other factor other than the 
misallocation of resources. 
5 Technically, TFPR and TFPQ must be jointly log-normally distributed to arrive at this equation. 
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we assume σ is the same for all sectors. 
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Note, the variance of TFPR is a sufficient statistic to measure the decrease in TFP due 
to the dispersion in TFPR. The larger an industry's TFPR dispersion, the lower the 
sector's aggregate total factor productivity. If resources could be reshuffled to firms 
with a higher marginal productivity, then the dispersion of TFPR would decrease and 
output would be higher. Thus, the dispersion in TFPR constitutes a suitable way to 
measure misallocation. Moreover, although there are many mechanisms by which 
misallocation could manifest itself, an increase in misallocation will result in larger 
dispersion in TFPR 6. 
2.2.3 Data 
To calculate the degree of misallocation within each industry, we use repeated cross-
sections of firm-level data from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production, which 
was collected by China's National Bureau of Statistics from 1998 to 2005. The survey 
includes non-state-owned firms with nominal revenues exceeding 5 million yuan 
(around $700,000) and all state-owned firms. The non-state-owned firms contain 
private, foreign and hybrid firms (local collectives, local government owned, etc.). The 
number of observations (firms) ranges from about 165,000 in 1998 to about 269,000 in 
2005. The data set includes information on the firm's industry (at the 4-digit level), 
value-added, export revenues, capital stock, the number of employees, wage payments, 
ownership, age, interest payment, liabilities, and taxes paid and subsidies received. 
We compute TFPR for each firm-level observation from Equation (2.1) using data on 
value-added, wage payments, and capital stock. Because prices, siP  , and non-wage 
compensation are not available in the survey, we follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and 
compute them as follows. First, we equate si siP Y  to the firm's value-added. Second, we 
define siK  as the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation. Third, we assume 
that the sum of the imputed benefits and wages --the non-wage compensation absent 
                                                   
6 See Hopehayn and Rogerson (1993), Lagos (2006), Caselli and Gennaioli (2013), Buera and 
Shin (2009), and Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008) for examples. 
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from the survey-- equals 50% of the value-added. We then map industry specific labor 
shares, 1 sα− , obtained from the NBER Productivity Database for the United States 
(based on the Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers), into our data set 7. After 
obtaining TFPR for each firm, we calculate the mean and the variance of TFPR for each 
4-digit industry (separately for each year). Recall that the latter corresponds to our 
measure of misallocation. 
To further explore how total factor productivity is affected by the 10th Five Year Plan 
we compute annual TFPQ for each firm i in the following manner. Given that data on 
firm-level output, siY , is not available from the survey, we follow Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) and raise the firm's value-added, si siP Y  , to the power σ/(σ-1) to obtain an 
estimate of siY . Replacing this estimate in Equation (2.4) we obtain 
1
1
( )
( )s s
si si
si si
si si
P YTFPQ A
K wL
σ
σ
α α
−
−= =  (2.4) 
where σ is the elasticity of substitution as defined above. Estimates of σ range from 
three to ten in the literature (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Hendel and Nova, 2006). We 
set σ equal to three in the benchmark estimation and check the robustness of the results 
to using other values. 
As mentioned earlier, our sample spans some --but not all-- years covered by the 9th 
Five Year Plan as well as the years when the 10th Five Year Plan was in place. Of the 
482 four-digit industries included in the Chinese Industrial Classification code, 117 
were supported by the 9th Five Year Plan. We exclude these industries from the sample 
in order to avoid confounding the effect of the 10th Five Year Plan with that of its 
predecessor. In addition, there are a few industries where the number of firms is too 
small to obtain a meaningful measure of misallocation. Thus, we retain only the 
industries that have 10 or more firms in each year. The resulting sample has a 902,175 
establishments across the eight years grouped in 299 industries. Of these industries, 88 
were supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. This group of industries constitutes our 
                                                   
7 Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we scale up the labor share by 3/2. 
15 
 
"treatment" group and we will refer to it as the supported group. The remaining 70% of 
the industries in the sample comprise our "control" or not supported group. The 
regressions below exploit the differential changes in the variance of TFPR across 
supported and not supported industries in order to estimate the impact of China's Five 
Year Plan on misallocation. 
2.3 The Effect of Industrial Policy on Misallocation 
This section provides descriptive evidence showing the effect of the 10th Five Year Plan 
on the variance of TFPR, explicitly details our difference-in-difference regression 
approach, and then presents our main results. 
2.3.1 Descriptive Evidence of the Impact of the 10th Five Year Plan on Misallocation 
The evolution of the variance of the logarithm of TFPR (var(logTFPR)) provides 
preliminary evidence that indicates the industrial policy leads to an increase in 
misallocation. Figure 2.1 plots the average var(logTFPR) for supported (solid line) and 
unsupported (dashed line) industries for each year in our sample. In the figure, we 
normalize our measure of misallocation to be 1 in 1998; the Appendix contains an un-
normalized version of Figure 2.1. Both groups had similar trends in misallocation prior 
to the enactment of the 10th Five Year Plan. Before 2001, misallocation for both groups 
was trending down. After 2001, misallocation increased for both groups. However, the 
increase was much larger for the supported industries. Relative to its nadir in 2001, 
misallocation in supported industries increased by 25 percent by 2005, about a 16 
percent increase relative to 1998. For industries not supported by the 10th Five Year 
Plan, misallocation increased by only 10 percent relative to 1998. This pattern suggests 
that the 10th Five Year Plan had a differential, and very large, impact on misallocation 
within supported industries. Since the average var(logTFPR) increased for both groups, 
it is also consistent with the notion that the 10th Five Year Plan increased misallocation 
overall. 
One of the objectives of the 10th Five Year Plan was to adjust development patterns 
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across different industries. This goal suggests the possibility that the Chinese 
government decided to support particular industries because it prioritized industries 
where misallocation was greater. If this were true, then this `reverse causality' might 
bias our estimates and change the interpretation of our results. However, we see no 
evidence that industries were targeted for support based on the misallocation observed 
prior to the 10th Five Year Plan. Table 2.1 reports the average variance of log TFPR, the 
mean of TFPR, and the mean of TFPQ broken down by supported and not supported 
industries in 2000. The average misallocation (dispersion of TFPR) exhibited within 
supported industries (0.410) was almost identical to the misallocation in not supported 
industries (0.413). Nevertheless, the firms supported by the 10th Five Year Plan were, 
on average, older and less export oriented and had greater government ownership. 
2.3.2 Estimation Strategy 
Our difference-in-difference (DID) regression approach allows us to adjust the raw 
comparison in Figure 2.1 by other covariates that could affect misallocation. This 
estimation strategy fits well with the fact that the data used in this paper consists of 
repeated cross-sections of firms sampled from the same aggregate industries, s, and not 
of a panel of firms. Misallocation within industries selected for support could differ 
from those industries not selected, and the period following the 10th Five Year Plan 
(after 2000) could have had a different level of misallocation for all industries. The DID 
lets us directly control for both of these concerns. We estimate the following regression: 
0(log ) * 2000 * ( 2000* )st t s st st stVar TFPR Post Supported Post Supported Xα φ η β γ ε= + + + + +
 (2.5) 
where (log )stVar TFPR  is the variance of log TFPR across firms in industry s in year t, 
2000tPost  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is after 2000, sSupported  is a 
dummy equal to one if the industry was supported by the 10th Five Year Plan, stX  is 
a vector of covariates, and stε  represents the error term. 
The covariates stX  include variables that vary at the industry and year level: the 
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average firm age, the average share of revenues from exports relative to value-added, 
and the proportion of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the industry. The motivation for 
including these controls is as follows. Several studies have documented a relationship 
between productivity and observable characteristics of the firm such as their age and 
size (see, e.g. Doms, Dune and Roberts 1995; Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh 2001). 
These variables are commonly used to capture differences in efficiency that stem from 
different levels of experience, managerial ability and production technologies. Here, 
because we use a measure of volatility at the industry level, we control for the average 
age in the industry. As for exports, empirical evidence from firm-level data suggests a 
positive relationship between the share of exporting firms and productivity. For instance, 
Wagner's (2007) survey of micro-economic studies finds that exporting firms are more 
productive than non-exporters and "more productive firms self-select into export 
markets". Hence we control for the average ratio of exports to value added in each 
industry, export/VA. The export/VA ratio is also intended to control for the increased 
participation of China in world trade 8. Finally, starting in 1996 the Chinese government 
implemented a series industrial policies known as "grasping the large and letting go of 
the small" intended to privatize and reduce the size of the state sector. Curtis (2016) 
suggests that total factor productivity increased with the growth of the private sector 
and the closing of the least productive SOEs. Hence, the dispersion of TFPR may vary 
across industries depending on the share of SOEs. 
The coefficients δ and η account for fixed differences in misallocation before and after 
2000 and between supported and not supported industries, respectively. Thus, the 
coefficient β captures how being supported by the 10th Five Year Plan affects 
misallocation. This is the key parameter of interest. It compares (log )stVar TFPR , our 
measure of misallocation, in the supported industries, before and after the plan was put 
in place, with (log )stVar TFPR  of the not supported group over the same period. In this 
                                                   
8  China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. However, China's government 
implemented policies aimed at opening the economy well in advance of joining the WTO. For 
example, Brandt et al. (2017) state that China's government began lowering tariff rates in 1992 and 
most tariff rates in the WTO accession agreement were fixed before 1999. 
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manner we are able to exploit cross-section and time series variation in the data while 
avoiding confounding the effect of the policy with that of unobserved variables that 
could have affected all industries at the same time. 
2.3.3 Estimation Results 
Table 2.2 reports the estimation results for Equation (2.5). Column (1) reports OLS 
estimates, with the control variables. Column (4) reports WLS estimates, also with the 
controls, where industries are weighted by value-added. Each regression is based on the 
full panel of 8 yearly observations for the 299 industries in our sample, or 2,392 
observations in total. Robust standard errors clustered by industry are in parentheses. 
The estimate of β (on Post2000×Supported) is statistically significant at the 10% level 
or better in all specifications. This represents our main empirical finding. Supported 
industries experienced a greater increase in misallocation than industries that were not 
supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. We take this as strong evidence that the process 
used to carry out China's centralized industrial plan did not deliver more resources to 
the firms in which the resources could be put to their best use, at least not over the Five 
Year time horizon included in our analysis. 
Moreover, the impact on misallocation is quantitatively large. Consider the most 
conservative result; in column (1), the estimate of β equals 0.026. One way to interpret 
this number is to look back at Table 2.1. The variance of TFPR in supported industries 
averaged about 0.41 in 2000. Thus, supported industries had about a 6.4 percent 
increase in misallocation (relative to being in the not supported group) after 2000, 
directly attribute to the Five Year Plan. This 6.4 percent increase accounts for a large 
portion of the overall increase in misallocation over time (about 25 percent in Figure 
2.1) and for nearly all the difference between supported and unsupported industries. 
Another way to interpret β is to look back at Equation (2.3). The increase in the variance 
of TFPR reduced overall TFP within supported industries. The exact magnitude of this 
effect depends on the parameter σ, but even at moderate values (e.g. 3), the effect is 
large. Both these interpretations might underestimate the true effect, though. In columns 
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(4) of Table 2.2, the WLS estimate for β is larger (0.058 versus 0.026). The policy 
appears to have had a strong impact on the misallocation of resources within large 
industries. Thus, the impact on the overall Chinese economy (rather than the impact for 
the average industry) may have been very big because the larger industries, quite 
obviously, make up a large share of the economy. If the 10th Five Year Plan increased 
misallocation by 15 percent or more within the large supported industries, then this 
greatly reduced overall TFP growth. 
It is also worth noting that misallocation went up for both supported and not supported 
industries over time. This pattern can be seen in Figure 2.1, and is reflected in the 
positive and significant estimate of δ (see Table 2.2). The coefficient estimate (η) for 
Supported is negative, although not statistically significant (possibly due to the fact that 
misallocation actually becomes larger for supported industries after 2001). In columns 
(1) and (4), the coefficient estimates for the other covariates have their expected sign. 
Older industries are more homogeneous in terms of TFPR. The coefficients of the mean 
of export revenues to value added are negative and significant in each specification, 
which indicates that industries with a higher share of export revenues to value added 
have less misallocation. Finally, industries with more State-Owned Enterprises exhibit 
much greater misallocation. 
While the use of the variance of log(TFPR) to measure misallocation follows naturally 
from the work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), other measures of dispersion also provide 
useful information regarding the effect of industrial policies. We have re-estimated 
Equation (2.5) using the interdecile and interquartile range as dependent variables. The 
estimation results reported in Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 2.2 confirm our 
previous findings: industrial policies resulted in a significant increase in misallocation. 
Indeed, the effect appears to have been larger for firms further away in the tails of the 
distribution, a topic we return to shortly. 
2.4 Digging Deeper into the Distributional Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan 
This section further explores the effect of the Chinese industrial policies on productivity 
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and misallocation. First, we present evidence that the 10th Five Year Plan increased 
average TFPR for supported firms but had little or no effect on average TFPQ. Two 
alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanations for the increase in misallocation 
(dispersion of TFPR), the increase in average TFPR, and the insignificant effect on 
average TFPQ are as follows. First, government policies may have had a heterogeneous 
effect on firms with different TFPR levels, so that the distortions introduced by the 
policies drove a larger wedge between the marginal products of capital and labor across 
firms, while leaving average productivity unaffected. Second, the support given to high- 
and low- productive firms might have been different. Both these possibilities have merit. 
We first show that the effect of the policy was heterogeneous across firms with different 
levels of revenue (TFPR) or physical (TFPQ) productivity. Then, we show that high- 
and low- productivity firms within supported industries received different levels of 
support. In particular, low-productivity firms in supported industries received tax 
breaks and direct subsidies. 
2.4.1 The Effect of the 10th Five Year Plan on Average TFPR and TFPQ 
The results presented in the previous section revealed that the 10th Five Year Plan 
increased misallocation as measured by the variance of TFPR. What was the effect of 
this industrial policy on the mean of TFPR and TFPQ? This section addresses this 
question by re-estimating Equation (2.5) where we replace the variance of TFPR with 
the industry mean of log TFPR. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 2.3 report the results. 
Again, we focus on the estimated coefficient for the interaction term 
( 2000* )stPost Supported  . Across all specifications, the estimate of β is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The 10th Five Year Plan tended to increase TFPR 
for firms in supported industries. These firms became more profitable relative to firms 
in not supported industries. 
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.3 report the results using mean log TFPQ as the 
dependent variable. In these regressions, the null of no average treatment effect (β=0) 
cannot be rejected. Moreover, the estimated effect in quantitatively small relative to 
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average TFPQ. We find no evidence that supported firms experienced an increase in the 
average physical productivity or technology level. Recall from Equations (2.1) and 
(2.2), TFPR equals TFPQ times price 9. Thus, the support obtained through the 10th Five 
Year Plan appears to have primarily increased the price that firms in supported 
industries charged, rather than their average productivity. 
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan 
In Section 2.3.3, we described how the DID strategy uncovers significant effects of the 
10th Five Year Plan on misallocation. In Section 2.4.1, we showed that the 10th Five 
Year Plan also leads to an increase in the mean of TFPR. Supported industries became 
more profitable on average but misallocation increased. However, the standard linear 
DID model recovers only the average treatment effect. Yet, the support provided by 
these industrial policies could be heterogeneous and depend on the pre-treatment 
covariates. In this section, we use the methodology developed by Athey and Imbens 
(2006) to estimate the quantile treatment effect for the supported firms in the difference-
in-difference setting and to check whether there exists evidence of heterogeneous 
effects. For this approach, we use the firm-level data, rather than aggregating 
observations into industries. 
We first use the original changes-in-changes (CIC) method proposed by Athey and 
Imbens (2006) to construct the counterfactual TFPR distribution that firms in the 
supported industries would have exhibited in the absence of the support provided by 
the 10th Five Year Plan and compare it with the observed TFPR distribution. We do this 
by estimating a CIC regression without including the covariates (see Figure 2.2, Panel 
A). Then we follow Garlick's (2018) methodology and redo the computation controlling 
for the same covariates as in Section 2.3.3 (see Figure 2.2, Panel B). 
The horizontal distance between the observed and the counterfactual TFPR distribution 
at each quantile represents the quantile treatment effect of the 10th Five Year Plan on 
                                                   
9 The calculation of TFPQ depends on σ.  Therefore, in the Appendix, we re-run these regressions 
using values of σ ranging from three to ten as a robustness check. Only at a σ value of ten does there 
appear to be any positive effect on TFPQ, and even then the impact is small. 
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firms in the supported industries. This distance, without and with adjustment for 
covariates, is plotted in Figure 2.3 along with the 95% confidence intervals constructed 
using a percentile bootstrap. Regardless of the adjustment, the point estimates are small 
and statistically insignificant for the lowest percentile. Yet, for the rest of the 
distribution the point estimates are positive and significant, albeit small (≤0.1 standard 
deviations). The largest point estimates are observed for TFPR percentiles that slightly 
exceed the median and for the extreme right tail. These results suggest that China's 
industrial policies lead to higher TFPR and increased misallocation because they raised 
revenue productivity for the highly productive firms while having no significant impact 
on the least productive firms. 
We also compute the counterfactual TFPQ distribution for the supported firms (Figure 
2.4) and estimate the quantile treatment effect on TFPQ (Figure 2.5). The point 
estimates are negative and significant, yet small (≤0.1 standard deviations) for the 
bottom quintile; positive and significant for the top quintile and insignificant for the 
rest of the distribution. The largest increase is observed at the extreme right tail where 
the point estimates exceed 0.1 standard deviations. These results reinforce our 
conclusion that, on average, industrial policies in China increased the price charged by 
supported firms but did not affect physical productivity for most of those firms. 
Nevertheless, significant heterogeneity in the effect on TFPQ is revealed in the graphs. 
The insignificant average effect of the support on TFPQ found with the difference-in-
difference model masks a negative effect for the physical productivity of the least 
productive firms and a positive effect for more productive firms. 
These results point towards three important distributional effects of the Chinese 
government policies. First, the 10th Five Year Plan appears to have driven a larger wedge 
between the marginal products of capital and labor for the supported firms over most 
of the TFPR distribution and especially for the most productive firms. Second, the fact 
that these policies resulted in higher (lower) physical productivity for the supported 
firms in the top (bottom) quintile suggest resources were reshuffled away from high-
productivity firms and toward less productive firms. Finally, for most of the supported 
firms (20th-80th quantile) resource productivity increased while physical productivity 
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remained unchanged. In brief, given that TFPR=P*TFPQ, our results suggest supported 
firms in all but the top quintile faced greater barriers to reallocation as a result of the 
10th Five Year Plan. 
It is important to note here that whereas the nonlinear DID model provides more 
information than the DID model, it requires stronger identification assumptions. More 
specifically, the quantile treatment effects are identified under the assumption that the 
distribution of the unobserved firm-level TFPR (TFPQ) determinants for supported or 
not supported firms does not change over time. Both the policy of "grasp the large and 
let go of the small" as well as the increased participation of China in world trade would 
suggest the distribution of the covariates might have changed over time. However, the 
fact that the quantile estimates are quantitatively very similar with and without 
controlling for covariates suggests that this is not a great concern. 
Finally, Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for the observed and counterfactual TFPR 
and TFPQ distributions. In other words, the reports measures of TFPR (TFPQ) 
dispersion for the observed distribution of supported firms and the counterfactual TFPR 
(TFPQ) for the same firms in the absence of the support. On the one hand, the mean 
and variance of TFPR are somewhat higher for the observed than the counterfactual 
distribution, regardless of the adjustment. The support provided by the 10th Five Year 
Plan increased the mean of TFPR by about 2% and the variance by approximately 1% 
for the supported firms. This is a result of the positive but small effect of the support on 
most quantiles of the TFPR distribution. On the other hand, the mean of TFPQ is 
essentially identical under the observed and under the counterfactual distribution, 
whereas the variance is approximately 6% higher. The support doled out by the 10th 
Five Year Plan thus appears to have left the mean of TFPQ unchanged while increasing 
the dispersion of TFPQ for the supported firms. This increase in dispersion is reflective 
of the negative effect of the support on the lower quintile and the positive effect on the 
upper quintile. Our results suggest industrial policies implemented by the Chinese 
government resulted not only in increased misallocation but in greater dispersion on the 
physical productivity among supported firms. 
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2.4.3 Mechanism: Taxes, Subsidies or Access to Credit? 
Three of the most common ways the Chinese government supports firms are tax breaks, 
direct subsidies, and access to credit. Each of these, when handed out to only a subset 
of firms, can distort the allocation of resources. The official documentation on the 10th 
Five Year Plan does not contain information regarding the mechanism used to support 
firms. So, we first turn to the data to inquire about the mechanisms used by the Chinese 
government to provide support and then investigate whether these mechanisms had a 
heterogeneous impact for firms with different initial levels of revenue productivity. In 
other words, could a differential treatment via taxes, subsidies or access to credit 
explain the heterogeneous impact of the plan on the distribution of TFPR and TFPQ? 
2.4.3.1 Descriptive Evidence of the Support Mechanisms 
Table 2.1 reports the share of firms that paid taxes and the average tax to value-added 
ratio broken down by supported and not supported industries in 2000, the year prior to 
the 10th Five Year Plan. Similarly, the also reports the share of firms in an industry that 
received subsidies, the average subsidy to value-added ratio, the percentage of firms 
that paid/received interest and the average interest to debt ratio split down by supported 
and not supported industries in 2000. 
In 2000, the percentage of firms that paid taxes was almost identical among supported 
(78.41%) and not supported (77.73%) industries. The average tax to value added ratio 
observed among supported industries was lower (0.032) than the rate for firms in the 
not supported industries (0.048). In addition, while the percentage of firms that received 
subsidies was slightly higher among supported industries (12.02% instead of 11.02%), 
the average subsidy to value added ratio for the supported firms (0.0210) was almost 
identical to that of the not supported industries (0.0212). Differences in the ratio of 
interest payments to debt among supported (0.0383) and not supported (0.0397) 
industries in 2000 also appears to be minimal. However, in 2000, firms in the supported 
industries were more likely to pay/receive interest (87.5%) than firms in the not 
supported industries (78.67%). Since the proportion of firms that paid interest was 75% 
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among the former and 70.6% among the latter, these numbers suggest supported firms 
were somewhat more likely to receive interest payments. 
2.4.3.2 A First Look into the Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on Taxes, Subsidies and 
Credit Conditions 
To inquire into the possible mechanisms used to support firms by the 10th Five Year 
Plan, we follow a two pronged approach. First, we use a Probit difference-in-difference 
model to estimate the effect of the plan on the probability that a firm pays taxes: 
Pr( 1) [ 2000 ( 2000 ) ]ist ist ist ist istY Post Supported Post Supportedφ α δ η β ε= = + + + × +  (2.6) 
where 1istY =  if firm i in industry s paid taxes at time t. We use a similar regression to 
estimate the impact of the plan on the probability that a firm receives subsidies and an 
ordered Probit regression to model the probability of receiving or paying interest. 
Second, we inquire into the effect of these industrial policies on the expected ratio of 
the latent taxes (subsidies) to value added, which we interpret as a proxy for the impact 
on the average tax (subsidy) rate faced by the supported firms. We employ a Tobit model, 
with the same control variables as before, to tackle this question. 
Column (1) of Table 2.5 reports the estimation results for the probability of paying taxes, 
whereas Column (2) reports the estimation results for the Tobit. Before discussing the 
results, note that while the coefficient on the interaction term in the Probit/Tobit model 
does not equal the treatment effect, the sign of the treatment in a Probit or Tobit model 
does equal the sign of the interaction term (see Puhani, 2012). Thus, the positive 
coefficient on the interaction term Post2000×Supported suggests that the probability of 
paying taxes and the tax rate increased for the supported firms during the 10th Five Year 
Plan. At a first glance, on average, tax breaks do not appear to have been used to provide 
support to firms in the targeted industries. 
Estimation results reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5 suggest support was 
doled out in the form of subsidies. First, the 10th Five Year Plan increased the probability 
of receiving subsidies as well as the expected ratio of subsidies to value added. The 
positive sign on the interaction terms is suggestive of a positive effect of the support on 
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the probability of paying subsidies as well as on the average ratio of subsidies to value 
added. 
Finally, we explore the impact of the plan on the credit conditions faced by the 
supported firms. Column (5) reports the estimation results for an ordered Probit model 
where the dependent variable takes a value of zero if the firm received interest payments, 
one if the firm did not receive or pay interest, and two if the firm paid interest. The OLS 
results for the ratio of interest to debt are reported in Column (6). Our estimates suggest 
the 10th Five Year Plan reduced the probability of paying interest for the supported firms, 
thus reflecting an improvement in credit conditions. However, the OLS results indicate 
there was no significant effect of the 10th Five Year Plan on the average interest to debt 
ratio. 
All in all, at a first glance, it would appear the 10th Five Year Plan led to an increase in 
average subsidies and a decrease in the probability of paying interest, but also an 
increase in taxes. 
2.4.3.3 Are All Firms Treated Equally under the 10th Five Year Plan? 
The results reported in the previous section are obtained under the assumption that all 
firms are treated equally. Yet, the fact that we find the 10th Five Year Plan to have 
heterogeneous effects on different quantiles of the TFPR and TFPQ distributions, 
suggest the support mechanisms might not affect all firms equally. Recall that the CIC 
model indicated that the plan increased TFPR for most of the distribution; yet, the 
increase was somewhat greater for the extreme tail of the distribution. However, the 
effect on TFPQ was negative for the lower quintile and positive for the upper quintile. 
These results suggest an increase in the barriers faced by firms in all but the highest 
quintile of the distribution. Moreover, government policies appear to have led to an 
increase in the labor and capital wedges for the least productive firms. 
To investigate whether the three key government supporting methods had unequal 
effects across the TFPR distribution, we partition the sample in the following manner. 
For each industry, we obtain the TFPR values that correspond to the 33rd and 67th 
quantiles of this pre-plan TFPR distribution. We then classify each firm-year 
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observation into the bottom, middle, or top tier of the pre-plan TFPR distribution for its 
industry. We re-estimate the difference-in-difference models of the previous section on 
the bottom and top tier subsamples 10. 
Tables 2.6 through 2.8 reproduce the estimation results for the subsamples. Three key 
insights are derived from these tables. First, as we noted in the previous section, the 
industrial policies implemented by the Chinese government increased the probability 
of paying taxes and the tax to value added ratio for all firms. Nevertheless, the 
probability of being taxed and the ratio of taxes to value added increased more for the 
bottom than the top tier of the pre-plan TFPR distribution (see Table 2.6). The greater 
effect of the policies on the least productive firms implies a greater increase in the labor 
and capital wedge induced by taxes on the bottom tier. In other words, while the least 
productive firms experienced a decline in physical productivity, the larger distortions 
implied by the tax policy led to heightened TFPR.  
Second, whereas the least productive firms in the supported industries experienced an 
increase in the probability of receiving subsidies and the ratio of subsidies to value 
added, the effect of the 10th Five Year Plan on the most productive firms was 
insignificant (see Table 2.7). Support doled out via larger subsidies for the least 
productive firms would have implied a decrease in TFPR for this group. Third, we find 
some suggestive evidence indicating that the most productive firms benefited from 
better credit conditions whereas the plan had no significant impact for the least 
productive firms (see Table 2.8). Note that the sign on the interaction term in the ordered 
Probit model is insignificant for the bottom tier of the TFPR distribution, but negative 
and significant for the top tier. 
We started this section by asking whether all firms were treated equally under the 10th 
Five Year Plan. The answer is, clearly, no. Our estimation results indicate that the least 
productive firms in the supported industries experienced a larger increase in the 
probability of paying taxes and in the ratio of taxes to value added. In addition, they 
also received a larger amount of subsidies (relative to their value added). In contrast, 
                                                   
10 Qualitatively, the results obtained by using the top and bottom quartile or the top and bottom 
quintile are identical. We opt for using tiers so as to have more representative subsamples. 
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firms in the top tercile faced a slight improvement in credit conditions as the probability 
of paying interest declined. All in all, our results suggest the unequal support provided 
to firms in different terciles of the distribution may explain the heterogeneity observed 
in the effect of the plan on the supported firms. 
2.5 Key Findings 
This paper explores how China's Five Year industrial policies affect the allocation of 
resources. Using micro-level data on manufacturing firms and a difference-in-
difference approach, we find that industrial policies had important effects on 
misallocation. The 10th Five Year Plan increased misallocation within supported 
industries as evidenced by the increase in the variance of TFPR and the dispersions of 
TFPR distribution. Moreover, the 10th Five Year Plan increased profitability (mean 
TFPR) of supported industries, but did not increase the physical productivity (mean of 
TFPQ) of supported industries. By estimating a changes-in-changes model, we also find 
that the 10th Five Year Plan had a positive and significant effect on TFPR over most of 
the TFPR distribution, with the effect being largest for firms with higher revenue 
productivity. Interestingly, the 10th Five Year Plan had a highly heterogeneous effect on 
the physical productivity of the supported firms. TFPQ significantly declined for the 
least productive firms in supported industries, but it increased for high-productivity 
firms. 
To uncover the reasons behind these results, we investigated how firms received support. 
Our results suggest that direct government subsidies and better credit conditions 
constituted the channels whereby the Five Year Plan contributed to the increase 
misallocation. Firms in the supported industries were more likely to receive subsidies 
and less likely to incur interest payments. Furthermore, we found that even firms from 
supported industries were treated unequally, which firms with lower TFPR from 
supported industries had higher probability to receive more subsidies, and firms from 
supported industries with the highest TFPR were less likely to pay interest.
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2.6 Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Supported and Non-Supported Industries 
Notes: V(TFPR) denotes the variance of log (TFPR). M(TFPR) and M(TFPQ) denote the mean 
values of log (TFPR) and log (TFPQ) respectively. Age is the average age of the firms in an industry. 
Export/VA is the average ratio of export revenue to value-added for the firms in an industry. SOE 
share is the percentage of state-owned firms in an industry. Interest share is the percentage of firms 
that received or paid interest in an industry. Interest/debt is the average ratio of interest payments to 
total debt across firms in an industry. Tax share is the percentage of firms that paid taxes in an 
industry. Tax/VA is the average ratio of taxes to value added across firms in an industry. Subsidy 
share is the percentage of firms that received subsidies in an industry. Subsidy/VA is the average of 
ratio of subsidy to value-added across firms in an industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Industry Supported Not supported 
Average across industries in 2000   
( )V TFPR  .4103 .4130 
( )M TFPR  1.5630 1.6335 
TFPR interdecile range (90th – 10th) 1.5321 1.5623 
TFPR interquartile range (75th – 25th) .7539 .7898 
( )M TFPQ  5.7588 5.7543 
TFPQ interdecile range (90th – 10th) 2.5815 2.5609 
TFPQ interquartile range (75th – 25th) 1.2760 1.3016 
Age 15.535 14.248 
Export/VA .8075 1.0726 
SOE share .2317 .1975 
Tax share .7841 .7773 
Tax/VA .0320 .0486 
Subsidy share .1202 .1102 
Subsidy/VA .0210 .0212 
Interest share .8750 .7867 
Interest / Debt .0383 .0397 
N (Industries) 88 211 
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Table 2.2: Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on the Dispersions of TFPR 
Notes: V(TFPR) denotes the variance of log(TFPR). (90th-10th) and (75th-25th) are the differences of TFPR between 
the 90th and the 10th percentiles and between the 75th and the 25th percentiles. Post2000 is the period dummy that 
takes the value one if the year is after 2000. Supported is a dummy that takes one if the industry is supported by the 
10th Five Year Plan. Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) and Mean (SOE share) denote the industry’s average age, 
export/value-added and state-owned enterprise share, respectively. WLS regressions are weighted by the industry’s 
share of value-added. The number of industry-year observations in all regressions is 2,392. Standard errors clustered 
at the 4-digit industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted 
by ***, ** and *, respectively 
 
 
 
 OLS WLS 
Variables V(TFPR) 90th -10th 75th -25th V(TFPR) 90th -10th 75th -25th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.0207* 0.0213 0.0117 0.0241 0.0401 0.0225 
 (0.0121) (0.0268) (0.0144) (0.0151) (0.0351) (0.0186) 
Supported -0.0144 -0.0374 -0.0313 -0.0148 -0.0344 -0.0272 
 (0.0230) (0.0534) (0.0285) (0.0381) (0.0859) (0.0456) 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0264* 0.0647** 0.0398** 0.0576*** 0.132*** 0.0815*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0314) (0.0184) (0.0210) (0.0442) (0.0250) 
Mean(Age) -0.0159*** -0.0357*** -0.0220*** -0.0142*** -0.0318*** -0.0202*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00598) (0.00313) (0.00534) (0.0120) (0.00641) 
Mean(Export/VA) -0.0260*** -0.0625*** -0.0306*** -0.0385*** -0.0887*** -0.0435*** 
 (0.00696) (0.0142) (0.00748) (0.0140) (0.0294) (0.0153) 
Mean(SOE share) 0.467*** 0.989*** 0.529*** 0.475** 1.039** 0.585** 
 (0.101) (0.227) (0.117) (0.188) (0.424) (0.226) 
Constant 0.572*** 1.936*** 1.016*** 0.571*** 1.914*** 0.998*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0779) (0.0403) (0.0420) (0.0955) (0.0504) 
R-squared 0.085 0.086 0.094 0.104 0.106 0.105 
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Table 2.3: Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on Mean of TFPR and TFPQ 
Notes: M (TFPR) and M(TFPQ) denote the mean of log(TFPR) and log(TFPQ), respectively. Post2000 is the period 
dummy that takes the value one if the year is after 2000. Supported is a dummy that takes one if the industry is 
supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) and Mean (SOE share) denote industry’s 
average age, export/value-added and state-owned enterprise share, respectively. WLS regressions are weighted by 
the industry’s share of value-added. The number of industry-year observations in all regressions is 2,392. Standard 
errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
 
  OLS WLS 
Variables M(TFPR) M(TFPQ) M(TFPR) M(TFPQ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post2000 0.0914*** 0.264*** 0.249*** 0.660*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0481) (0.0551) (0.118) 
Supported -0.0579 0.0213 -0.129 -0.173 
 (0.0395) (0.0526) (0.0818) (0.124) 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0471** 0.0355 0.102** 0.0992 
 (0.0202) (0.0266) (0.0412) (0.0738) 
Mean(Age) -0.0118*** -0.00718 -6.71e-06 0.0219 
 (0.00445) (0.00755) (0.0121) (0.0176) 
Mean(Export/VA) -0.0245*** -0.0205* -0.0171 0.0235 
 (0.00704) (0.0108) (0.0155) (0.0298) 
Mean(SOE share) 0.149 0.108 0.905* 2.093*** 
 (0.177) (0.299) (0.480) (0.749) 
Constant 1.783*** 5.796*** 1.478*** 5.090*** 
 (0.0595) (0.124) (0.120) (0.260) 
R-squared 0.054 0.086 0.265 0.518 
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Table 2.4: Support Effects of the Five Year Plan on TFPR and TFPQ Dispersion 
 
Observed 
distribution 
Counterfactual 
distribution 
Support effect 
Support effect 
in % terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TFPR: without adjusting for covariates 
Mean 
1.7250 1.6860 .0390 2.26 
(.0014) (.0031) (.0034)  
Variance 
.4756 .4701 .0056 1.18 
(.0017) (.0038) (.0041)  
 TFPR: adjusting for covariates 
Mean 
2.0786 2.0397 .0389 1.87 
(.0033) (.0044) (.0035)  
Variance 
.4645 .4613 .0032 .69 
(.0018) (.0032) (.0036)  
 TFPQ: without adjusting for covariates 
Mean 
6.0144 6.0122 .0022 .04 
(.0023) (.0046) (.0051)  
Variance 
.9696 .9107 .0589 6.07 
(.0032) (.0064) (.0068)  
 TFPQ: adjusting for covariates 
Mean 
5.8827 5.8821 .0006 .01 
(.0056) (.0068) (.0052)  
Variance 
.9728 .9164 .0564 5.80 
(.0035) (.0064) (.0069)  
Notes: Column (1) shows the observed distribution of firms in supported industries, and column (2) 
shows the distribution for the same firms in the absence of support. Column (3) shows the effects 
of the Five Year Plan on firms from the supported industries. Column (4) shows the effect of the 
Five Year Plan as a percentage of the counterfactual level. Standard errors in parentheses are from 
500 bootstrap iterations. 
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Table 2.5: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Taxes, Subsidies and Interest Payments 
 
Tax Dummy Tax/Value-
added 
Subsidy 
Dummy 
Subsidy/Value-
added 
Interest 
Payment 
Interest/Debt 
Variables Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Ordered Probit OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.113*** -0.00331*** 0.203*** 0.185*** -0.204*** -0.00609 
 (0.00454) (0.000773) (0.00536) (0.00603) (0.00399) (0.00990) 
Supported -0.185*** -0.0309*** 0.0464*** 0.0393*** 0.125*** -0.000441 
 (0.00534) (0.000942) (0.00653) (0.00731) (0.00502) (0.0120) 
Post2000 × 
Supported 
0.0747*** 0.0135*** 0.0259*** 0.0297*** -.0368*** 0.0153 
(0.00646) (0.00113) (0.00767) (0.00860) (0.00591) (0.0144) 
Age 0.0124*** 0.000798*** 0.00678*** 0.00681*** 0.0121*** -0.000218 
 (0.000153) (2.32e-05) (0.000147) (0.000163) (0.000131) (0.000302) 
Export -0.601*** -0.0595*** 0.282*** 0.224*** -0.134*** -0.0218*** 
 (0.00315) (0.000582) (0.00363) (0.00412) (0.00287) (0.00727) 
State-owned -0.0548*** 0.0118*** 0.205*** 0.257*** -0.205*** -0.0287** 
 (0.00548) (0.000890) (0.00574) (0.00635) (0.00471) (0.0115) 
Cut-point 1     -1.538***  
     (0.00415)  
Cut-point 2     -0.493***  
     (0.00385)  
Sigma  0.235***  1.113***   
  (0.000201)  (0.00246)   
Constant 0.818*** 0.00968*** -1.535*** -1.772***  0.0593*** 
 (0.00430) (0.000733) (0.00519) (0.00705)  (0.0094) 
Observations 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 
Notes: The tax dummy equals 1 if a firm pays taxes, 0 otherwise. The subsidy dummy equals 1 if a firm receives 
subsidies, 0 otherwise. Interest Payment takes the value of 1 if the firm receives interest payments, 2 if it does not 
receive nor pay interests, and 2 if it pays interests. Interests/Debt is the ratio of a firm’s interest payment to total 
liabilities. Export is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm export, 0 otherwise. State-owned is a dummy that equals to 1 if 
a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Tax Payments 
 Bottom tier Top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
Variables Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post2000 0.0989*** 0.00186 0.0850*** -0.00690*** 
 (0.00784) (0.00262) (0.00790) (0.000483) 
Supported -0.168*** -0.0484*** -0.202*** -0.0188*** 
 (0.00898) (0.00308) (0.00952) (0.000609) 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0871*** 0.0226*** 0.0448*** 0.00740*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00388) (0.0111) (0.000703) 
Age 0.0162*** 0.00201*** 0.00811*** 0.000272*** 
 (0.000259) (7.51e-05) (0.000263) (1.53e-05) 
Export Dummy -0.724*** -0.150*** -0.476*** -0.0201*** 
 (0.00573) (0.00207) (0.00516) (0.000345) 
Ownership 0.0186** 0.0249*** -0.127*** 0.00457*** 
 (0.00887) (0.00276) (0.00987) (0.000605) 
Constant 0.598*** -0.0377*** 0.981*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.00740) (0.00248) (0.00748) (0.000460) 
Sigma  0.435***  0.0891*** 
  (0.000736)  (0.000117) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 368,188 368,188 
Notes: Tax dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays tax, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. 
Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Subsidies 
 Bottom tier Top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
Variables Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post2000 0.199*** 0.286*** 0.233*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.00910) (0.0164) (0.00990) (0.00280) 
Supported 0.0297*** 0.0366* 0.0646*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0193) (0.0124) (0.00350) 
Post2000 × 
Supported 
0.0725*** 0.116*** -0.00991 -0.00433 
(0.0132) (0.0237) (0.0140) (0.00394) 
Age 0.00660*** 0.0106*** 0.00599*** 0.00161*** 
 (0.000248) (0.000440) (0.000274) (7.69e-05) 
Export Dummy 0.222*** 0.259*** 0.301*** 0.0549*** 
 (0.00660) (0.0119) (0.00612) (0.00176) 
Ownership 0.170*** 0.367*** 0.225*** 0.0693*** 
 (0.00932) (0.0165) (0.0109) (0.00304) 
Constant -1.423*** -2.668*** -1.682*** -0.479*** 
 (0.00881) (0.0190) (0.00959) (0.00340) 
Sigma  1.790***  0.283*** 
  (0.00693)  (0.00118) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 368,188 368,188 
Notes: Subsidy dummy equals to 1 if a firm receives subsidy, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has 
exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Interest Payments 
 Bottom tier Top tier 
 Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit OLS 
Variables Interest Payments Interest/Debt Interest Payments Interest/Debt 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) 
Post2000 -0.174*** -0.00778*** -0.238*** -0.00473 
 (0.00714) (0.00285) (0.00664) (0.0240) 
Supported 0.129*** 0.000225 0.114*** 9.53e-05 
 (0.00869) (0.00333) (0.00859) (0.0300) 
Post2000 × Supported -0.0115 0.000147 -0.0505*** 0.0234 
 (0.0107) (0.00420) (0.00975) (0.0347) 
Age 0.0119*** -4.28e-05 0.0128*** 0.000129 
 (0.000231) (8.44e-05) (0.000223) (0.000761) 
Export Dummy -0.200*** -0.0132*** -0.116*** -0.0247 
 (0.00539) (0.00218) (0.00451) (0.0168) 
Ownership -0.157*** -0.0116*** -0.297*** -0.0496* 
 (0.00797) (0.00310) (0.00823) (0.0301) 
Cut point 1 -1.449***  -1.639***  
 (0.00741)  (0.00691)  
Cut point 2 -0.507***  -0.457***  
 (0.00691)  (0.00640)  
Constant  0.0378***  0.0710*** 
  (0.00270)  (0.0228) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 368,188 368,188 
Notes: Applied interest rate is measured with firm’s interest payment divided by total liability. Applied interest rate 
D is a dummy variable with 1, 2, and 3, corresponding to whether a firm pays negative, zero and positive interest 
rate. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals 
to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.7 Figures 
Figure 2.1: Normalized Mean or Variance of TFPR and TFPQ 
 
Notes: The values in 1998 for each variable is normalized to be1, and values in other years are 
divided by the original values in 1998 for each variable. 
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Figure 2.2: Quantile Treatment Effects of 10th Five Year Plan on TFPR 
 
Notes: The covariates include firm’s age, export dummy variable, and firm’s ownership.
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Figure 2.3: Quantile Treatment Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on Supported Firms’ 
TFPR 
 
Notes: The control variables include firm’s export share to value-added, age, and ownership. Solid 
lines denote the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on changes at percentiles of firms’ TFPR, and dash 
lines refer to the confidence intervals at 5% level.
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Figure 2.4: Quantile Treatment Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on Supported Firms’ 
TFPQ 
 
Notes: The covariates include firm’s age, export dummy variable, and firm’s ownership 
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Figure 2.5: Quantile Treatment Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on Supported Firms’ 
TFPR 
 
Notes: The control variables include firm’s export share to value-added, age, and ownership. 
Solid lines denote the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on changes at percentiles of firms’ 
TFPQ, and dash lines refer to the confidence intervals at 5% lev 
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Chapter 3 Unequal Effects of Industrial Policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A large and growing literature has investigated the effects of industrial policies on 
economic outcomes such as growth and productivity. For example, Restuccia and 
Rogerson (2008) examine the effects of tax and subsidies on aggregate productivity and 
find that policy distortions lead to decrease in output and TFP. Lewis (2004) argues 
policies will increase the cost of labor and will further affect productivity. Guner et al 
(2008) analyze that some unequal policies have different effects on firms with different 
sales or labor. Policies with good original intentions might bring unexpected byproducts, 
which might harm growth or productivity. 
Policy can also influence economic activities by affecting resource allocation. Hsieh 
and Moretti (2015) study that housing regulations result in misallocation of individuals 
across US metropolitan areas, and further contribute to a loss in aggregate GDP. Pro-
state-owned enterprises policies in China hinder resources allocation between state-
owned and other firms in China, which result in productivity losses of Chinese 
manufacturing industries. (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011)) Due to different 
characteristics of firms and industries across provinces, policies might have 
heterogeneous effects on them. 
Using Chinese manufacturing firm-level data, I examine whether there are unequal 
effects of the most important industrial policy in China –the Five Year Plan-on 
misallocation, profitability and real technology. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I 
compute firm’s revenue productivity (TFPR) and physical productivity (TFPQ) to 
measure profitability and real technology, respectively. Misallocation is measured by 
the variance of TFPR for an industry. Larger variance of firm’s revenue productivity  
of an industry will lower the industry’s aggregate total factor productivity (Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2009).  
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The Five Year Plan is made by the central government to guide economic and 
investment activities to support specific industries in the following five years. Local 
governments are the executors of the Five Year Plans. However, local governments 
might support industries differently due to different economic status of the supported 
industries. For example, if the supported industries in one province are considered to 
be pillar industries, but not in another province, they might receive different support 
from local governments. Therefore, industrial policies may result in unequal effects 
across regions. 
As targeted firms and industries in different provinces might receive different support, 
I use the share of value-added of supported industries in a province to denote supporting 
intensity in that province. Higher supporting intensities are found in less developed 
provinces in western China, whereas more developed provinces in the eastern coasts 
have lower supporting intensities before the issuing of the 10th Five Year Plan. However, 
some provinces experience an increase in supporting intensity, some exhibit decrease, 
and some others show no significant trends once the Five Year Plan is enacted. 
I find that the Five Year Plan increased misallocation in the supported industries in 
provinces with higher value-added share of supported industries, consistent with Chen 
et al (2018). Moreover, the Five Year Plan improved average profitability and real 
technology of industries in provinces with higher supporting intensities. To address 
potential concerns that the Five Year Plan might capture effects of other macro events 
in China, I control for state-owned enterprise reforms and joining the World Trade 
Organization of China. The effects of the Five Year Plan still remain after including 
these controls.  
3.2 Five Year Plan and Supporting Intensity 
3.2.1 The Five Year Plan 
The most important and widely influential industrial policy in China is the Five Year 
Plan, which has been enacted by the central government every five years since the 
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establishment of the People’s Republic of China 11. The main goals of the Five Year 
Plans are to guide investment and economic activities in the following five years. For 
example, the aim of the first Five Year Plan issued in 1953 was to guide investment into 
the establishment of multiple industries in most provinces and districts. Every Five Year 
Plan lists the industries that are going to be supported in the following five years, and 
industries which are considered to be important for national defense like metal smelting 
are supported for most of the Five Year Plans. 
Local governments are the executors of the Five Year Plans. After the issue of the Five 
Year Plan by the central government, local governments like provincial, district, and 
county make regional plans to support the industries mentioned in the Five Year Plans 
by the central government. Local governments take all kinds of measures to support 
these industries, because the development of these industries is one of the important 
indicators for officers’ promotion. 
3.2.2 The 10th Five Year Plan 
I study the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation, profitability and 
technology. The reason to focus on the 10th Five Year Plan is that firm-level data is only 
available from 1998-2005. The 9th and the 10th Five Year Plans span from 1996-2000 
and 2001 to 2005, respectively. Therefore, the available data allows me to examine the 
effects of the 10th Five Year Plan. Moreover, the data are from the Annual Surveys of 
Industrial Production conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The 
surveys contain information such as firm’s age, wages, subsidies, industry, location, 
value-added, tax payments, book value of net depreciation, etc. Based on the official 
documents of the Five Year Plans and firm’s industry information in the data set, I can 
identify the 4-digit level industries that are supported by the 9th or the 10th Five Year 
Plans. 
Like most of the recent Five Year Plans, the 10th Five Year Plan by the central 
government lists the name of supported industries in the official document. Therefore, 
                                                   
11 Most of the Five Year Plans were issued every five years since 1953, except there are 3 years gap between the 
second and the third Five Year Plans. 
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with this information, I am able to match the supported industries in the Five Year Plan 
to the industries and firms in the data set. However, Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics used different Chinese Industrial Classifications (CIC) codes to classify 
industries before and after 2002. The first step is to match the CIC codes of the years 
1998-2001 with those of 2002-2005, even though there are only a small portion of 
industries that changed their codes number. I use the industrial codes of 2002-2005 to 
recode those in 1998-2001. The next step is to match the industries supported by either 
the 9th or 10th Five Year Plans to the 4-digit level industries in the data set. I match the 
date sets by hand for accuracy. After matching, supported industries can be identified, 
and all firms inside the supported industries are also treated as in the supported group. 
After matching, there are 194 industries supported by the 10th Five Year Plan out of the 
total 482 four-digit industries. Moreover, 89 of the supported industries are supported 
by both the 9th and the 10th Five Year Plans, and 105 of the supported industries are 
supported by the 10th Five Year Plan only. Specifically, around 53% firms are in the 
industries supported by the 10th Five Year Plan, and around 33.4% firms are supported 
by the 10th Five Year Plan only. 
A natural question to ask is: why are these industries are supported by the 10th Five Year 
Plan? From the official documents of the 10th Five Year Plan, the aims to support these 
industries are to restructure industries and to enhance international competitiveness. 
Industries like raw materials manufacturing and textiles manufacturing are encouraged 
to restructure by increasing products variety, improving quality, reducing energy use 
and pollution, using more advanced technology, etc. Moreover, hi-tech industries such 
as computer equipment, airplane manufacturing, and optoelectronic materials 
manufacturing should adopt the world frontier technology to be more internationally 
competitive. 
As an industry or a firm can be supported by both the 9th Five Year Plan, it brings 
interference to identify the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on industries’ outcomes. 
Therefore, in order to identify the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation, 
profitability and technology, I need to eliminate the effects of the 9th Five Year Plan to 
avoid over-estimation of the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan. As mentioned above, the 
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available data ranges from 1998 to 2005, which covers the last three years of the 9th 
Five Year Plan period and the whole five years of the 10th Five Year Plan period. 
Therefore, industries can be divided into four groups by whether they are supported by 
the 9th or the 10th Five Year Plans. These four groups of industries are: (1) supported by 
the 9th Five Year Plan only, (2) supported by the 10th Five Year Plan only, (3) supported 
by both the 9th and the 10th Five Year Plans and (4) not supported by neither the 9th nor 
the 10th Five Year Plans.  
Only groups (2) and (4) are kept in the date set to identify the effects of the 10th Five 
Year Plan. The Five Year Plans could potentially affect misallocation of supported 
industries. Therefore, if industries supported by the 9th Five Year Plan are included in 
the sample, the estimates could be biased. I exclude industries supported by the 9th Five 
Year Plan to avoid these compounding effects. 
3.2.3 Supporting Intensity 
As executors of the Five Year Plan, local governments might support the targeting 
industries differently. The importance of the supported industries for the local economy 
might affect the governments’ supporting strength. For example, if the supported 
industries happen to be considered pillar industries and contribute most of the value-
added for a province or district, local governments could provide more support to those 
industries.  
As industries might obtain difference support, I use the ratio of value-added of 
supported industries to that of all industries in a province to measure supporting 
intensity. Higher supporting intensity does not guarantee that the target industries will 
obtain more support. Figure 3.1 shows support intensities in different provinces in 
different years. Panel A and B show supporting intensities in provinces before the issue 
of the 10th Five Year Plan. Surprisingly, less developed provinces in the middle and 
western regions have higher supporting intensity. Provinces in the eastern coast have 
relatively lower intensities. After the issue of the 10th Five Year Plan in 2001, a few 
provinces move to tiers with higher level of intensity, but there are also some provinces 
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that move to groups with lower level of intensity from 2000 to 2001. By the end of the 
10th Five Year Plan in 2005, more provinces have lower levels of intensities, which is 
also surprising because supported industries should have higher value-added share after 
receiving support from local governments.  
Besides the geographical difference of supporting intensity among provinces, Figure 
3.2 shows the change of value-added share for each province from 1998-2005. The 
supporting intensities in provinces such as Hainan, Xizang, and Ningxia Hui, increased 
after the issue of the 10th Five Year Plan. However, the supporting intensities of 
provinces like Beijing, Hubei, Jiangxi and Xinjiang, decreased drastically, and the 
intensity of some other provinces dropped slightly. 
Several possible reasons can explain why supported industries have lower value-added 
shares in 2005 than 2001. First of all, compared with supported industries, there might 
be more firms and faster development in not supported industries. Secondly, the Five 
Year Plan could have had an opposite effect on the value-added of supported industries 
to the original aim. For example, if most of the support is given to firms with lower 
productivities, the overall growth rate of the supported industries will lag behind. 
Moreover, if local governments choose to support those largest state-owned firms, a 
decrease in competition could lead industries to have lower output. 
3.3 Regional Misallocation and Productivities 
3.3.1 Measurement of Misallocation, Profitability and Technology 
I follow Foster et.al (2008), and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to measure profitability, 
technology and misallocation for firms and industries. Foster et.al (2008) first propose 
to use revenue total factor productivity (TFPR) and physical productivity (TFPQ) to 
measure profitability and technology, respectively. Subsequently, Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) suggest that the larger of the variance of TFPR in an industry, the larger of 
misallocation within that industry. Following Foster et. al (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009), I compute the revenue productivity and physical productivity as below:  
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where siTFPR  refers to the profitability (revenue productivity) of firm i  in industry 
s , and siTFPQ  denotes the technology (physical productivity) of firm i  in sector s . 
siP , siY  and si siP Y  are the output price, output quantity and value-added of firm i  in 
industry s , respectively. Moreover, siA  measures firm’s technological level, which is 
also TFPQ, siK  is the capital input of firm i  in industry s  , and siwL  measures 
firm’s aggregate labor input. In addition, for sector s , sα is the marginal product to 
capital, and 1 sα−  the marginal product to labor. Therefore, TFPR measures 
productivity of unit value-added to capital and labor input, and TFPQ measures 
productivity of unit quantity to capital and labor input.  
However, TFPQ values cannot be computed directly from the firms’ information in the 
data, therefore, I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to compute TFPQ by raising si siP Y  
to the power / ( 1)σ σ −  to get siY  . TFPQ can be obtained by using the following 
expression: 
1
1
( )
( )s s
si si
si si
si si
P YTFPQ A
K wL
σ
σ
α α
−
−= =  (3.3) 
where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between firm value-added, and its value 
ranges from three to ten (Broda and Weinstein, 2006, Hendel and Nova, 2006).  
After the computation of TFPR and TFPQ for each firm, the mean of TFPR and TPFQ 
and the variance of TFPR in sector s  in province p  can also be obtained, which I 
use them to measure profitability, technology and misallocation in industry s   in 
province p  . In addition, the reason why misallocation could be measured by the 
variance of TFPR is given in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), as is shown in (3.4). 
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As there are no computed labor and capital shares for Chinese manufacturing industries, 
I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and use those in American manufacturing industries 
to measure labor and capital shares. Therefore, before computing TFPR and TFPQ 
values for Chinese firms, the Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) code should be 
matched with American Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, so as to obtain 
the values of labor share (1 α− ) for different Chinese industries. The classifications of 
industries in SIC and CIC are similar to each other, but there are also some small 
differences. If one industry in SIC is corresponding to several industries in CIC, all 
these industries in CIC will be given the value of labor share in SIC. However, if one 
industry in CIC is corresponding to several industries in SIC, this industry in CIC will 
be assign the average value of labor shares of the corresponding industries in SIC. For 
example, a 4-digit industry with code “1310” in CIC is corresponding to two industries 
of “2041” and “2044” in SIC. If the (1 α− ) values for “2041” and “2044” were 0.2 and 
0.4 respectively in 2001, the (1 α− ) value of industry 1310 in CIC will be given 0.3 
(average of 0.2 and 0.4) in 2001. After obtaining the values of labor share for each 
industry in Chinese manufacturing, I still follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to compute 
labor share by scaling up 3/2 to (1 α− ), and then obtain the firm-level TFPR and TFPQ 
values. Therefore, regional misallocation in a specific industry can be obtained by 
taking variance of firm’s TFPR within the industry and region, and average profitability 
and technology can be obtained by computing the mean of industry’s TFPR and TFPQ 
in a region in any given year. 
3.3.2 Quantifying Misallocation across Regions 
Figure 3.3 shows misallocation across provinces. As Panel A illustrates, misallocation 
is measured by the average of variance of manufacturing industries in a given province 
in 1998. Panel A and B show misallocation before the issue of the Five Year Plan in 
1998 and 2000. The three northeastern provinces and some provinces in middle China 
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have the most serious misallocation, and there is less misallocation in the more 
developed eastern provinces and less developed western provinces. Panel C shows 
misallocation in 2001, when the Five Year Plan was issued; there is no apparent 
difference in misallocation between 2001 and 2000. However, misallocation in 2005 in 
Panel D is more severe than before. There are more provinces with higher levels of 
misallocation, especially provinces in the middle and northeastern in China. 
Surprisingly, there are still lower levels of misallocation in more developed eastern 
coastal provinces. 
Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of misallocation in each province over the years. 
Consistent with the above description, more developed provinces such as Shanghai, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, experienced lower levels of misallocation both before and after 
the Five Year Plan. Some provinces such as Tianjin and Henan, had lower levels of 
misallocation, but increasing in variance of TFPR after 2001. Provinces like Sichuan 
and Xinjiang, have a descending trend in misallocation before the Five Year Plan, but 
upward trend after the Five Year Plan. And some other provinces such as Qinghai and 
Ningxia, experienced more fluctuations in misallocations during the period. Overall, 
there are increases in misallocation in most provinces after the Five Year Plan.  
3.3.3 Endogeneity of the Five Year Plan 
There are two concerns about the endogeneity of the issue of the 10th Five Year Plan. 
The first one is reverse causality. If the Five Year Plan was issued because the central 
government expected that there was misallocation, profitability and technology 
problems in the supported industries, there would be reverse causality from the Five 
Year Plan to the outcomes of interest. 
The presence of reverse causality is not likely. The official document of the 10th Five 
Year Plan states that the reason to support these industries is to optimize industry 
structure and to make them more competitive with foreign firms. For example, the 
central government encourages some industries like computer equipment 
manufacturing and biotechnology engineering by helping them to use the new advanced 
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technology of the world. 
Moreover, Chen et al (2018) show statistical evidence that there are little concerns of 
endogeneity of the issue of the Five Year Plan on misallocation, revenue and physical 
productivity. The distributions of variance and mean values of TFPR and TFPQ before 
the issue of the Five Year Plan, show no evidence that central government only supports 
industries that are experiencing high misallocation, or lower profitability and 
technology There is no evidence to indicate that central government expected there 
would be misallocations, profitability and technology problems in these supported 
industries in the future. 
The second concern of endogeneity is that some unobserved variables might be 
correlated with the issue of the Five Year Plan. The relationship between unobserved 
variables and the issue of the Five Year Plan is untestable. Therefore, Chen et al (2018) 
examine whether there are significant differences between supported and not supported 
industries by groups of observed variables. They find that there are industries with both 
most and least number of employees, with both most and least number of firms, and 
with both large-sized and small-sized firms in both supported and not supported 
industries. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Method 
Following Aghion et. al (2008), I start with the following specification, 
[( ) ( ) ]spt sp pt st st pt sptY Fiveyearplan Intensityλ λ λ β ε= + + + × +  (3.5) 
where sptY  is a (logged) 4-digit province-industry outcome variable in each year. The 
dependent variables are variance of TFPR, mean of TFPR and mean of TFPQ, which 
measure misallocation, average revenue productivity and physical productivity, 
respectively. ( )stFiveyearplan   is the interaction of a time dummy and an industry 
dummy. The time dummy variable equals to 1 if an industry or a firm is in the Five Year 
Plan period, and 0 otherwise. And the industry dummy equals to 1 if an industry of a 
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firm is in the supported group, and 0 otherwise. ( ) ptIntensity  refers to the ratio of 
total value-added of supported industries to the total of value-added of all industries in 
province p  in year t  . spλ  are province-industry interactions, ptλ  are province-
year interactions, and stλ  are industry-year interactions. sptε  is a stochastic error. 
I am interested in the coefficient of the interaction of the Five Year Plan and value-
added intensity β , which captures the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on resource 
allocation and productivities of different industries. 
3.4.2 Results 
To examine the average effect of the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation for different 
provinces, I first consider a model without the interactions in column (1) to (4) in Table 
3.1. The results in column (1) show the average effects of the Five Year Plan on 
misallocation across provinces. The positive and significant coefficient indicates that 
the 10th Five Year Plan brought more misallocation to industries that were supported by 
the industrial policy than those than were not supported. Even after the standard errors 
are clustered at province level in column (2), the coefficient of the interaction of the 
Five Year Plan is still positive and significant. As the 10th Five Year Plan was issued at 
the same time for all provinces, I cluster standard errors only at provincial level.  
To investigate how large is the effect of the Five Year Plan on misallocation, I use the 
methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to compute the effect. For example, in 
columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of the interaction are both 0.12, which indicates 
that there will be 18% larger misallocation in supported industries than not supported 
ones. This effect is quite large compared with those estimated in Chen et al (2018), 
where misallocation is measured at industry and year level. One possible explanation 
why larger effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation are found is that provinces 
with less number of firms and less aggregate value-added usually exhibit a rapid growth 
in variance of TFPR after the Five Year Plan. 
Columns (5) and (6) examine the effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on misallocation of 
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provinces with different supporting intensities. The estimation results reported in 
column (5) correspond to a model that includes province-year, industry-year and 
province-industry fixed effects. The results reveal a positive and significant effect of 
the industrial policy on misallocation across provinces and industries. The coefficient 
on the interaction indicates that 10% increase in the ratio of intensity will improve 
misallocation by 3% among supported industries. After clustering the standard errors 
by province, the coefficient in column (6) is still positive and significant. 
As the 10th Five Year Plan increases misallocation measured by variance of TFPR 
across provinces with different intensities, it changes dispersions of firm’s TFPR of 
supported industries. The next natural question to ask is whether the Five Year Plan 
changes the average values of TFPR and TFPQ? Table 3.2 shows the effects of the 10th 
Five Year Plan on revenue productivity of industries in provinces with different 
intensities. Columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of the industrial policy on 
industry’s average revenue productivity without and with clustering, respectively. The 
positive and significant coefficients on the interaction indicate that the Five Year Plan 
increases supported industry’s average revenue productivity. As revenue productivity 
measures profitability, the Five Year Plan increases supported industries’ average 
profitability.  
Intensity is controlled in the models reported in columns (3) and (4). Coefficients of the 
Five Year Plan are still positive and significant, but the magnitude drops by half relative 
to those in columns (1) and (2). The coefficients on intensity are positive and significant, 
indicating that the Five Year Plan improves average profitability of supported industries 
in provinces with higher value-added shares of supported industries. Columns (5) and 
(6) examine the effects of the Five Year Plan and intensity on industry’s average 
revenue productivity, which the positive and significant coefficients show that the larger 
of intensity in a given province, the larger effects of the Five Year Plan on increasing 
average revenue productivity of industries in the province. 
The effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on physical productivity are shown in Table 3.3. 
Columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of the industrial policy on industry’s physical 
productivity across provinces without and with clustering at province, respectively. The 
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positive and significant coefficients show that the Five Year Plan increases real 
productivity of supported industries at the provincial level. However, Chen et al (2018) 
find no significant effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on physical productivity measured 
by 4-digit industry level. The reason for the difference with Chen et al (2018) might be 
that differences in the effect of the plan on TFPQ across provinces disappear when the 
data is aggregated across provinces. 
After adding value-added intensity into the model, as is shown in columns (3) and (4), 
the coefficients of intensity are positive, which indicates that the higher proportion of 
value-added in supported industries of all industries in a certain province, the higher of 
average real technology level of industries in the province. Moreover, the coefficients 
of the Five Year Plan are still positive and significant. Columns (5) and (6) present the 
results of the interactions of the Five Year Plan and supporting intensity on industry’s 
physical productivity, which the models include province-year, industry-year and 
province- industry interactions. The interaction coefficients are still positive, indicating 
that for provinces with higher intensities of the supported industries, the Five Year Plan 
increased the technology level of the supported industries more.  
The estimation results reveal that the 10th Five Year Plan had different effects on 
misallocation, revenue productivity and physical productivity on provinces with 
different intensities. In provinces with higher proportion of value-added of supported 
industries, there increase in misallocation, average profitability, and technology levels 
in the province, brought by the Five Year Plan was greater. 
3.4.3 Concerns about Effects of the Five Year Plan on Intensity 
One potential concern is that province intensities respond to changes in industry mix 
following the 10th Five Year Plan. To control for this, I use variables of intensity at 1998 
and 2000 respectively to measure intensity in other years. The year 1998 is the earliest 
year in the sample, and 2000 is the year before the 10th Five Year Plan was enacted. The 
results using intensity at 1998 and 2000 are shown in Table 3.4. 
Columns (1) and (2), which include the Five Year Plan and intensity at 1998 variables, 
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show the coefficients remain positive and significant, indicating that the higher 
intensity at 1998 of an industry in a given province, the more misallocation will be in 
the supported industry of the province after the 10th Five Year Plan. Columns (3) and 
(4) present the effects of the interaction of the Five Year Plan and value-added intensity 
at 1998 on misallocation, and the coefficients are still positive and significant, 
indicating that industries in provinces with higher proportion of value-added in 1998 in 
supported industries will have more misallocation during the 10th Five Year Plan period. 
I also check the effects of interaction of the Five Year Plan with intensity at 2000. The 
results are presented in columns (5) to (8). The coefficients remain positive and 
significant. Both the coefficients of the interactions between the Five Year Plan and 
value-added intensities in the pre-policy years are similar in magnitude to those of the 
interactions between the Five Year Plan and value-added intensity in each year. 
Table 3.5 presents the results of the interactions between the Five Year Plan and 
intensities of pre-policy years on industry’s average revenue productivity and physical 
productivity. The coefficients remain positive and significant, indicating that the higher 
proportion of value-added in supported industries to all industries in years before the 
Five Year Plan in a given province, the higher profitability and technology levels of the 
industry in such province in the following years. Therefore, the pre-policy cross-
province variation in intensity will affect how industries respond to the Five Year Plans 
in the following years. 
3.4.4 SOE Reform and WTO Joining 
Another potential concern is that the effects of the Five Year Plan might capture the 
effects of state-owned-enterprises (SOE) reforms on outcomes. There have been 
reforms for state-owned-enterprises since the Reform and Opening Policy in China. 
The main content of reforms is to establish modern enterprise system in SOE, promote 
the shareholding system in SOE, and introduce capital from private, foreign entities, 
etc. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 3.6 examine the effects of SOE reforms on 
misallocation together with the Five Year Plan. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
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estimation results for a model that adds the variable of value-added share of SOE for 
all firms within the industry. The coefficients of SOE share are not significant, which 
is consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2009). However, the coefficients of Five Year 
Plan and intensity remain positive and significant. Columns (3) and (4) include the 
interaction of SOE share and intensity, but their coefficients remain insignificant. The 
coefficients of the interactions between the Five Year Plan and intensity are still positive 
and significant, indicating that the Five Year Plan does not capture the effects of SOE 
reforms in affecting misallocation. 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November, 2001, during the 
period of the 10th Five Year Plan. Forming part of the WTO made it potentially easier 
for firms to export their products. Easier access to export might change the distribution 
of firm’s productivity, because exporting could make firms more productive. As there 
is an overlap between the period spanning the 10th Five Year Plan and the period post 
joining the WTO, the Five Year Plan might capture the effects of joining the WTO on 
misallocation and productivities. 
Thus, changes in TFPR and TFPQ of exporting firms might be driven by the 
international demand shocks. Therefore, I introduce the ratio of value-added in 
exporting firms to that of all firms within the industry to control for the effect of joining 
the WTO. Columns (5) to (8) in Table 3.6 present the effects of the Five Year Plan and 
joining into WTO on industry’s misallocation. The coefficients of the Five Year Plan 
and intensity in columns (5) and (6) remain positive and significant, and the coefficients 
on the share of exporting firms’ value-added are negative and significant, which 
indicates that the higher share of value-added of exporting firms for an industry, the 
less misallocation within the industry. In columns (7) and (8), I keep the interactions of 
the Five Year Plan and intensity, and of the value-added share of exporting firms and 
intensity, and the results show that the Five Year Plan still increases misallocation in 
industries in provinces with higher supporting intensity, and the higher value-added 
share of export firms of an industry is, the less misallocation in that industry. 
Moreover, columns (9) and (10) aim to control for the effects of the SOE reforms and 
joining the WTO together with the Five Year Plan. The results are consistent with the 
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previous findings. That is, the Five Year Plan increased misallocation among industries 
in provinces with higher intensity, joining the WTO decreased misallocation of 
industries with more exporting firms, and SOE reforms had an insignificant influence 
on industries’ misallocation. 
Table 3.7 also examines the effects of the Five Year Plan together with SOE reforms 
and joining the WTO on industries’ average TFPR and TFPQ. Columns (1) and (2) 
present the effects of the Five Year Plan and SOE reforms with value-added intensity 
on sectors’ average profitability. The coefficients measuring the effects of the Five Year 
Plan are still positive and significant, and the coefficient measuring the effects of SOE 
reforms in column (2) is negative and significant, indicating that the higher share of 
SOE of an industry, the less profitability of the industry has. Results in columns (3) and 
(4) indicate that the Five Year Plan increases industry’s average profitability, and 
joining the WTO also increases industry’s average profitability. 
Columns (5) and (6) present the effects of the Five Year Plan and SOE reforms on 
industry’s average technology level. The positive and significant coefficients to 
measure the effects of the Five Year Plan indicate that the plan increases supported 
industry’s technology level. The positive and significant coefficient of SOE share 
indicates that the higher share of SOE in an industry, the higher level of the average 
technology of the industry. Columns (7) and (8) present the effects of the Five Year Plan 
and joining the WTO on industry’s average technology level, and results show that the 
Five Year Plan increases industry’s average technology level, but the effect of joining 
the WTO has insignificant influence on industry’s technology level. 
3.4.5 Other Robustness Checks 
The ratio of intensity of supported industries in all industries might also be correlated 
with misallocation, profitability and technology levels of industries in a given province. 
Therefore, I construct a dummy to distinguish whether an industry is in the top, middle 
or bottom tercile of the cross-province distribution of misallocation, profitability and 
technology for a given year. I then interact the middle and bottom terciles with the Five 
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Year Plan omitting the top tercile as a control group, and Table 3.8 shows the effects of 
the Five Year Plan interacting with different terciles on the variance or mean of TFPR 
and TFPQ.  
Column (1) presents the coefficient to measure the effect of the Five Year Plan remains 
positive, indicating the Five Year Plan increases misallocation. The coefficients of the 
interactions with middle and bottom terciles are both negative, indicating that being in 
the middle and bottom terciles is associated with less misallocation relative to the top 
tercile. Results in columns (2) and (3) indicate that the Five Year Plan increases 
profitability and technology levels of sectors in provinces with higher ratio of intensity, 
but being in the middle and bottom are associated with a smaller increase in profitability 
and technology levels relative to the top tercile. 
3.5 Key Findings 
The question of how would industrial policy affect industry’s behavior was examined. 
Using the 10th Five Year Plan as testing ground, I computed variables to measure 
misallocation, profitability and technology for industries with firm level data, and then 
tested the effects of the most important industrial policy in China-the Five Year Plan- 
on industries’ outcomes. 
The main finding is that the Five Year Plan had unequal effects on provinces with 
different supporting intensities. Consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Chen et 
al (2018), I found misallocation existing across Chinese manufacturing industries. But 
the effects varied in provinces with different proportions of supported industries. 
Specifically, the 10th Five Year Plan increased misallocation of industries in provinces 
with higher value-added share of supported industries. Among industries that were 
supported by the 10th Five Year Plan, if value-added share of supported industries 
increased by 10%, misallocation caused by the Five Year Plan would increase by 3%. 
Moreover, the Five Year Plan also increased average profitability and technology levels 
of industries in provinces with higher value-added share of supported industries. 
As the Five Year Plan might change the supporting intensities, I use supporting intensity 
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at the year of 1998 and 2000 as dependent variables to conduct the robustness check. I 
found that industries in provinces with original higher value-added share of supported 
industries had larger misallocation, higher profitability and technology levels. 
Moreover, the SOE reforms and joining the WTO might also affect firms’ and industries’ 
productivities, therefore, I also checked the effects of SOE reforms and joining the 
WTO together with the Five Year Plan, and still found consistent conclusions that the 
Five Year Plan increased misallocation, profitability and technology levels of supported 
industries. Compare with industries in top tercile of misallocation, profitability and 
technology levels respectively, I found that industries in the middle and bottom 
experienced less misallocation, lower profitability and lower technology increase. 
 
 
3.6 Tables 
Table 3.1: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Variance of TFPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Variance (TFPR) Variance (TFPR) Variance (TFPR) Variance (TFPR) Variance (TFPR) Variance (TFPR) 
Five Year Plan 
0.161*** 0.161*** 0.120*** 0.120***   
(0.0124) (0.0296) (0.0122) (0.0132)   
Intensity 
  0.0229*** 0.0229***   
  (0.000618) (0.00229)   
Five Year Plan×Intensity 
    0.00333*** 0.00333*** 
    (0.000398) (0.000563) 
N 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 
R-squared 0.435 0.435 0.452 0.452 0.481 0.481 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Year×Sector Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Sector×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Cluster at province No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: Variance (TFPR) is measured at 4-digit industry level for a given province. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.2: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Mean of TFPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Mean (TFPR) Mean (TFPR) Mean (TFPR) Mean (TFPR) Mean (TFPR) Mean (TFPR) 
Five Year Plan 
0.148*** 0.148*** 0.0762*** 0.0762***   
(0.00892) (0.0471) (0.00825) (0.0123)   
Intensity 
  0.0414*** 0.0414***   
  (0.000416) (0.00463)   
Five Year Plan×Intensity 
    0.00142*** 0.00142*** 
    (0.000258) (0.000403) 
N 55,283 55,283 55,283 55,283 55,283 55,283 
R-squared 0.889 0.889 0.906 0.906 0.915 0.915 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Year×Sector Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Sector×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Cluster at province No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: Mean (TFPR) is measured at 4-digit industry level for a given province. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Mean of TFPQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Mean (TFPQ) Mean (TFPQ) Mean (TFPQ) Mean (TFPQ) Mean (TFPQ) Mean (TFPQ) 
Five Year Plan 
0.365*** 0.365** 0.143*** 0.143***   
(0.0167) (0.145) (0.0128) (0.0228)   
Intensity 
  0.109*** 0.109***   
  (0.000543) (0.0125)   
Five Year Plan×Intensity 
    0.00327*** 0.00327*** 
    (0.000507) (0.000369) 
N 55,317 55,317 55,317 55,317 55,317 55,317 
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.980 0.980 0.984 0.984 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Year×Sector Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Sector×Province Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Cluster at province No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: Mean (TFPQ) is measured at 4-digit industry level for a given province. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Variance of TFPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) V (TFPR) 
Five Year Plan 
0.110*** 0.110***   0.110*** 0.110***   
(0.0122) (0.0127)   (0.0122) (0.0127)   
1998 Intensity 
0.0258*** 0.0258***       
(0.000609) (0.000878)       
2000 Intensity 
    0.0291*** 0.0291***   
    (0.000685) (0.000987)   
Five Year Plan× 1998 
Intensity 
  0.00317*** 0.00317***     
  (0.000373) (0.000517)     
Five Year Plan× 2000 
Intensity 
      0.00324*** 0.00324*** 
      (0.000373) (0.000515) 
N 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 
R-squared 0.457 0.457 0.481 0.481 0.457 0.457 0.481 0.481 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Year×Province FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year×Sector FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Sector×Province FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Cluster at province No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: V(TFPR) refers to the variance of TFPR at 4-digit industry level in a province. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Mean of TFPR and TFPQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables M (TFPR) M (TFPR) M (TFPQ) M (TFPQ) 
Five Year Plan× 1998 Intensity 
0.00129***  0.00303***  
(0.000365)  (0.000460)  
Five Year Plan× 2000 Intensity 
 0.00130***  0.00311*** 
 (0.000378)  (0.000461) 
N 55,283 55,283 55,317 55,317 
R-squared 0.915 0.915 0.984 0.984 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Province Fixed Effects No No No No 
Sector Fixed Effects No No No No 
Year×Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year×Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector×Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster at province No Yes No Yes 
Note: M(TFPR) and M(TFPQ) refer to the mean of TFPR and TFPQ at 4-digit industry level in a province, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Variance of TFPR  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Five Year Plan 
.119*** .119***   .117*** .117***   .116***  
(.0123) (.0131)   (.0123) (.0131)   (.0130)  
Value-added Intensity 
.0226*** .0226***   .0231*** .0231***   .0229***  
(.00066) (.0021)   (.00062) (.00232)   (.00212)  
Five Year Plan ×
Intensity 
  .00336*** .00336***   .00319*** .00319***  .00324*** 
  (.00040) (.00056)   (.00040) (.00056)  (.000557) 
State-owned share 
.0424 .0424       .0213  
(.0296) (.0525)       (.0546)  
Exporting share 
    -.0191*** -.0191***   -.0182**  
    (.00573) (.00682)   (.00712)  
State-owned share ×
Intensity 
  -.000846 -.000846      -.00166 
  (.000766) (.00144)      (.00160) 
Exporting share ×
Intensity 
      -.00052*** -.00052***  -.00060*** 
      (.00014) (.00016)  (.000197) 
N 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 44,110 
R-squared 0.452 0.452 0.481 0.481 0.452 0.452 0.481 0.481 0.452 0.481 
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Province FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Year×Province FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year×Sector FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Sector×Province FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
65 
 
 
Table 3.7: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Mean of TFPR and TFPQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables  M (TFPR) M (TFPR) M (TFPR) M (TFPR) M (TFPQ) M (TFPQ) M (TFPQ) M (TFPQ) 
Five Year Plan 
0.0790***  0.0795***  0.132***  0.144***  
(0.0122)  (0.0123)  (0.0202)  (0.0230)  
Value-added Intensity 
0.0420***  0.0412***  0.107***  0.109***  
(0.00460)  (0.00459)  (0.0121)  (0.0125)  
Five Year Plan×Intensity 
 0.00165***  0.00150***  0.00321***  0.00319*** 
 (0.000417)  (0.000391)  (0.000494)  (0.000487) 
State-owned share 
-0.0888    0.387***    
(0.0598)    (0.110)    
Exporting share 
  0.0204***    0.00892  
  (0.00467)    (0.00889)  
State-owned share × VA 
Intensity 
 -0.00577***    0.00165   
 (0.00153)    (0.00378)   
Exporting share× Intensity 
   0.000329***    -0.000315 
   (0.000115)    (0.000276) 
N 55,283 55,283 55,283 55,283 55,317 55,317 55,317 55,317 
R-squared 0.906 0.915 0.906 0.915 0.980 0.984 0.980 0.984 
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Province FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Sector FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year×Province FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year×Sector FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sector×Province FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: M(TFPR) and M(TFPQ) refer to the mean of TFPR and TFPQ, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Effects of the Five Year Plan on the Variance or Mean of TFPR and TFPQ 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables V (TFPR) M (TFPR) M (TFPQ) 
Five Year Plan×Intensity 
0.0141*** 0.0121*** 0.0174*** 
(0.000880) (0.000613) (0.00107) 
Five Year Plan×Middle Tercile 
-0.692*** -0.516*** -0.685*** 
(0.0309) (0.0197) (0.0244) 
Five Year Plan×Bottom Tercile 
-0.924*** -0.971*** -1.399*** 
(0.0351) (0.0321) (0.0448) 
N 44,110 55,283 55,317 
R-squared 0.506 0.923 0.986 
Year×Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year×Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector×Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster at Province Yes Yes Yes 
Note: V(TFPR), M(TFPR) and M(TFPQ) refer to the variance of TFPR, mean TFPR and TFPQ at 
4-digit industry level in a province, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Panel B: Value-added of Supported Firms to that of All Firms in 2000 
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Figure 3.1 Panel A: Value-added of Supported Firms to that of All Firms in 1998 
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Figure 3.1 Panel C: Value-added of Supported Firms to that of All Firms in 2001 
Figure 3.1 Panel B: Value-added of Supported Firms to that of All Firms in 2005 
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Figure 3.2: Supporting Intensity across Provinces 
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Figure 3.3 Panel A: Misallocation in 1998 
Figure 3.3 Panel B: Misallocation in 2000 
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Figure 3.3 Panel C: Misallocation in 2001 
Figure 3.3 Panel D: Misallocation in 2005 
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Figure 3.4: Misallocation across Provinces 
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Chapter 4 Listing, Profitability and Productivity 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Large amount of empirical research has revealed the benefits of capital market 
development, such as increasing innovation (Hsu et al, 2014), absorbing shocks (Frank 
and Sanita, 2018), and promoting economic growth (Levine and Zeros, 1995; Aghion 
et. al., 2005). A natural question then is: what are the effects of capital market 
development on firms’ outcomes? Research on this question has focused on the effects 
of listing on firm’s innovation and investment activities. For example, Hsu, Tian and 
Xu (2014) found equity market development encourages innovation while credit market 
development discourages innovation using country level data.  
A recent paper by Bernstein (2015) investigated the effects of listing on stock market 
on innovation by comparing the group of firms that go public and the group of firms 
that withdraw their initial public offering filing. Using the amount of successful patent 
application to measure innovation, and NASDAQ fluctuations as instrument for listing, 
he finds internal innovation declines after listing, due to listed firms reducing internal 
innovations but acquiring external innovations. This offers evidence that listing on a 
stock market also changes firm’s behavior. 
A firm’s decision to be listed on a stock exchange stems from different reasons. For 
example, firms can raise capital from the stock market with lower financing cost, 
increase reputation, and improve liquidity of equity. Moreover, firm’s equity owners 
will also have chances to optimize equity value by listing on stock market. A question 
then emerges to equity owners and potential newcomers is: does listing on a stock 
exchange have a positive effect on firm’s profitability and technology? 
The main goal of this paper is to provide quantitative evidence on the potential effects 
of listing on firm’s profitability and technology. In theory, financial development should 
have positive effect on convergence (Aghion, et al, 2005) and economic growth 
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(Blackburn, et al, 1998; Levine and Zeros, 1999). 
I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Foster et al (2008) in using revenue productivity 
and physical productivity to measure firm’s profitability and technology, respectively. 
Revenue productivity is computed as the value-added of a firm divided by the labor and 
capital input. Compared with the nominal profits or nominal net profit, revenue 
productivity could measure a firm’s ability to earn profits better.  
I use Chinese firm-level data from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production (ASIP) 
(1998-2007). The large data set includes information of more than 2 million 
manufacturing firms over 10 years. However, listing information is not available in the 
ASIP data. I use data from WIND database which only includes the information of 
listing firms and then merge it with the ASIP data. Summary statistics show that listed 
firms have lower average profitability but higher technology levels across the 10 years.  
The decision to be listed on the stock market for firms can be endogenous due to reverse 
causality and unobserved variables. For instance, if owners expect their firm will be 
more profitable in the future and has no liquidity pressure, they might tend to listing the 
firm to the stock market. To tackle this endogeneity concern, I use the number of 
investment banks in a city as instrument variable. The number of investment banks in 
a city should not be correlated with a firm’s profitability or technology besides through 
listing, because in the first place, for a firm to be listed in a stock exchange it has to be 
underwritten by investment banks. Second, it is usually the banks that offer financing 
to firms in China, and investment banks will have little connection to firms if it’s not 
about listing. Data on start-up venture capital such as that used by Asker and Farre-
Mensa (2014) is not available, neither are stock price fluctuations as in Bernstein (2015).  
Instead, I use the number of investment banks in the current year and the numbers of 
investment banks in the former year or the past 5 years as instrument in a difference-
in-difference model. I find that listing on a stock exchange increases firm’s profitability 
and technology (when the values of the elasticity of substitution between firm’s value-
added is assumed to be large numbers 12). However, new investment banks or branches 
                                                   
12 I assume different values for elasticity of substitution between firm’s value-added following Broda and 
Weinstein (2006). 
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may be established where there are potential qualified firms to be listed on the stock 
market. Using the number of investment banks at specific years from 1994 to 1998 as 
instrument shows that the conclusions are robust: listing increases profitability and 
technology.  
Moreover, investment banks are usually located in large cities, and the instrument 
variable might capture the effects of geographic location near large markets. I include 
dummy variables to divide firms into a group that are located in large cities and a group 
that are not in large cities. The latter is defined as all 31 province capital cities and other 
6 large port cities as large cities. After controlling for the geographic effects, I still find 
consistent conclusions that listing increases profitability and technology. State-owned 
enterprise reforms also happen at the beginning of the sample period. The results are 
still consistent after controlling firm’s ownership. As there are requirements about 
profits for listing, I truncate the data set to keep all listing firms and other firms with 
top 25% profit only. The results show that listing increases profitability of listed firms 
comparing with the rest firms in the truncated sample.  
In addition, besides profitability and technology, I investigate what other changes listing 
brings to firm’s balance sheet. It’s worth checking because changes on firm’s balance 
sheet such as income, profit and wages might provide insights as to the mechanism 
whereby listing affects profitability and technology. The results show that listing 
increases firm’s fixed assets and long-term investment, long-term liabilities, state-
owned, corporate and personal capital, and nominal profits, and decreases other assets 
beside fixed asset, current liabilities, total liabilities, foreign capital, and cost. However, 
listing also decreases all kinds of wages and welfare, and increases all kinds of taxes. 
Although Bernstein (2015) examined the effects of listing on innovation with firms who 
submitted an application to be listed, I take a new approach to measure profitability and 
technology measured by TFPR and TFPQ, respectively. In addition, I use a new 
instrument to tackle endogenous concerns. My research is also related to other studies 
such as Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014) who find equity market development increases 
innovation, and Fama and French (2004) and Doidge et al (2017) find that listing 
changes firm’s many characteristics. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. I describe the data and show summary 
statistics in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4.4 provides 
the main results. I conduct robustness check in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 analyzes 
potential bias. And Section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 Data 
The data I use is from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production from 1998 through 2007, 
collected by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The data includes non-state-owned-
enterprises with nominal revenue over 5 million yuan, and all state-owned-enterprise 
(SOE). There are over 2 million firms in the data across the ten years, with the number 
of firms ranging from over 165,000 in 1998 to 330,000 in 2007. Firm’s information 
such as firm’s name, address, subdivided industry code, age, value-added, capital stock, 
wage payments, ownership, profits, assets, tax and subsidy is included in the data. 
The information about firms listed in a stock market is from WIND, which includes 
name, stock code, listing time (year, month and date), listed stock exchange, and other 
information of all listed firms since the establishment of the stock exchange in 1990. 
The number of listed firms in the manufacturing sector increases from 299 in the 
beginning of 1998 to 792 by the end of 2007. Since there is no information about listing 
in the ASIP data, I am not able to identify which firms are listed on a stock exchange in 
the ASIP data set. As mentioned above, the data set from WIND includes information 
such as name and listing time of all listed firms. Therefore, I merge the data set of listed 
firms from WIND to the ASIP data set by firm’s name. I identify 661 firms listed in a 
stock exchange in the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production data set. 
I follow Foster et al (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to measure profitability and 
technology, which firm’s profitability (TFPR) is measured by the ratio of value-added 
to capital and labor input, and firm’s technology (TPFQ) is measured by the ratio of 
output quantity to capital and labor input. However, the quantity of output cannot be 
observed in the data set. I still follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to compute TFPQ by 
scaling up value-added in TFPR with the elasticity of substitution between firm’s value-
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added. Specifically, TFPR and TFPQ are defined and computed as follows, 
1
PYTFPR PA
K Lα α−
= =  (4.1) 
1
1 1
( )Y PYTFPQ A
K L K L
σ
σ
α α α α
−
− −= = =  (4.2) 
where P refers to price level, Y refers to the quantity of output for firms, and PY to 
value-added. K and L are capital and labor input respectively for firms, and sigma is 
the elasticity of substitution between firm value-added, which sigma typically ranges 
from three to ten in the literatures (e.g. Broda and Weinstein, 2006). I report the 
empirical results as sigma is set to be different values. 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of listed firms and non-listed firms. Column (1) 
depicts the TFPR of listing firms by the end of 1998, 2003 and 2007, which the mean 
of TFPR of listing firms decreases from 1998 to 2003, and increases from 2003 to 2007. 
The mean of TFPR for non-listing firms in column (2) increases from 1998 to 2007, 
and the values of each year in column (2) is larger than those in column (1), respectively, 
which means even though listed firms are usually larger firms, the average profitability 
is lower than non-listing firms. Columns (3) and (4) are the mean values of TFPQ of 
listing and non-listing firms in different years, respectively. TFPQ values of listing 
firms are much larger than those of non-listing firms of each year correspondingly. 
Moreover, 1 also shows that the number of identified listed firms increases from 299 
by the end of 1998 to 661 in 2007, and the number of investment banks increases from 
90 in 1998 to 243 in 2007. 
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
The specification I use to identify the effects of listing on a stock exchange on firm’s 
profitability and technology is as follows: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( )it it it it s p t itY Listing Post Listing Xα γ β δ λ λ λ ε= + + × + + + + +  (4.3) 
where itY  refers to the outcome of firm i, firm’s profitability (TFPR) or technology 
(TFPQ). itListing  is a dummy variable, which it equals to one if firm i is listed on a 
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stock exchange, otherwise zero. ( )itPost Listing×  equals to one after firm i listed on a 
stock market, and equals to zero for listing firms before they are listed on a stock 
exchange, and for non-listing firms. itX  includes control variables such as firm’s age 
and value-added. 1sλ  , 1pλ  , and 1tλ  are industry, province and year fixed effects, 
respectively. 1γ , 1β  and 1δ  are coefficients, 1α  is the constant, and 1itε is the error 
term. I am interested in the coefficient 1β , which captures the effects on a firm’s TFPQ 
and TFPR after listing on a stock exchange. Specifically, it measures the difference of 
outcomes for firms after listing on a stock market compared with outcomes before 
listing and with non-listing firms. 
However, listing on a stock exchange can be endogenous for firms. The first reason can 
be reverse causality. Firm owners seek to listing on a stock exchange might be out of 
avoiding future profitability drop, since firm owners usually know more about firm’s 
operation status whether there is high probability of profitability drop. Or listing on a 
stock exchange will make firms more profitable by increasing firm’s reputation, 
therefore, firm owners will decide to list firms on stock exchanges.  
The other possible reason could be unobserved variables. Many unobserved factors 
could affect firm’s profitability and technology, such as industrial policies and financial 
restrictions. For example, financial restrictions, could be correlated with firm’s decision 
about listing on a stock exchange, but cannot be observed or measured. Therefore, 
listing on a stock exchange can be endogenous to firm’s profitability and technology. 
I use the number of investment banks in a city as instrument variable to address the 
endogeneity issue. The number of investment banks is correlated with firm’s 
profitability or technology only through listing. The main business activities for 
investment banks are securities brokerage, buying and selling stocks, and securities 
underwriting. Investment banks are the only institutions that assist firms to list on a 
stock exchange. Investment banks will not help with firm’s financing unless they are 
underwriting firm’s stocks, which instead the main source of funds for firms in China 
is from banks.  
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In the first-stage regression, I regress the firm’s outcomes on the number of investment 
banks in the city where the firm is located in, and the specification is as follows, 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( )it it it it s p t itListing InvBank Post InvBank Xα γ β δ λ λ λ ε= + + × + + + + +  (4.4) 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3( ) ( )it it it it s p t itPost Listing InvBank Post InvBank Xα γ β δ λ λ λ ε× = + + × + + + + +  (4.5) 
where itInvBank and ( )itPost InvBank×  are the instrument variables for itListing  and 
( )itPost Listing×  , respectively. The second-stage equation to estimate the effects of 
listing on firm’s outcomes is as follows, 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4( )it it s p t itit itY Listing Post Listing Xα γ β δ λ λ λ ε
−−−−−−−− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
= + + × + + + + +  (4.6) 
Where itListing
−−−−−−−−
 and ( )itPost Listing
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
×  are predicted values from (4.4) and (4.5). I 
complete the estimations using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Robust standard errors 
are computed for both the first- and second-stage regressions.  
Moreover, the number of investment banks in a city is an appropriate instrument 
variable for listing because it satisfies the relevance condition and exclusion condition. 
As mentioned above, the number of investment banks is correlated to firm’s listing, 
because firms to be listed on a stock exchange have to be underwritten by investment 
banks. The estimated coefficients reported in Table 4.2 show that the number of 
investment banks have a significant effect on firm’s listing. The number of investment 
banks in a city has no correlation with firm’s profitability and technology besides by 
listing. Therefore, the number of investment banks should be correlated with firm’s 
profitability and technology only through listing. 
4.4 Results 
In Table 4.2 I report the first-stage results of listing on the number of investment bank. 
Column (1) reports the effects of the number of investment bank at current year on 
listing, and the positive and significant coefficient indicates that the more of investment 
banks at the current year in a city, more firms will be listed on a stock exchange. 
However, the process of listing since the startup until being listed on a stock exchange 
81 
 
may last several months or more than one year. Therefore, I include the lags of the 
number of investment banks in a city as instrument variables. The positive and 
significant coefficients across columns (2) to (6) indicate that the more of investment 
banks in a city in the former years, the more firms from the city will be listed on a stock 
exchange. Moreover, the coefficients become larger (except the one in column (1)) with 
the leading periods, which means the number of investment banks in earlier years has 
larger effects on the number of listing firms than in the later years.  
Table 4.3 reports the main results of listing on firm’s profitability. The instrument in 
column (1) is the number of investment banks at current year. The coefficient of the 
interaction is positive and significant, which indicates firms becomes more profitable 
after listing on a stock exchange. I use the number of investment banks in former years 
to replace the number of investment banks in the current year as instrument variables 
across columns (2) to (6). I do find positive and significant coefficients of the 
interaction. Moreover, the coefficient of the number of investment banks five years ago 
is larger than those of the later years, indicating that cities where a larger number of 
investment banks were located originally, the larger the probability of a firm being listed 
on the stock exchange. 
Table 4.4 reports the effects of listing on firm’s technology, where technology is 
measured by TFPQ and is computed from TFPR by assuming the elasticity of 
substitution between firm’s value-added equals 3. The instrument variables are the 
number of firms of the current year and the former years. The coefficients of the 
interaction are not significant across all the columns, which means that listing on a stock 
exchange has no significant effects on firm’s technology.  
As mentioned above, TFPQ is computed from TFPR by scaling up firm’s value-added, 
it will first bring errors to measure technology by assuming the same elasticity of 
substitution 13 between firm’s value-added. Secondly, when assuming different values 
to elasticity of substitution, it might also result in different effects of listing on firm’s 
technology. Therefore, Table 4.5 reports the effects of listing on firm’s technology when 
                                                   
13 Elasticity of substitution between firms measures the ease with which a firm can be substituted for others. 
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the elasticity of substitution is assigned different values as robustness check. Columns 
(1) and (2) show the effects of listing on firm’s TFPQ when sigma is set to be 5, but the 
instrument variables are the number of investment banks at current year and 3 years 
ago. The coefficients of the interaction are significantly positive, indicating that listing 
on a stock exchange increases firm’s technology. Columns (3) to (6) also check the 
effects of listing on technology when sigma values are set to be 7 and 10, and all the 
coefficients of the interaction are significantly positive, which the results are consistent 
with columns (1) and (2). The values of elasticity of substitution do not affect the 
empirical results. 
Therefore, listing on a stock exchange has significantly positive effects on firm’s 
technology, when technology is computed with larger values of elasticity of substitution 
between firm’s value-added. The effects of listing on technology are insignificant only 
when the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 3, which is the lowest of the values. 
Larger (smaller) elasticity of substitution means higher (lower) price level and lower 
(higher) technology level for a given profitability level. When the elasticity of 
substitution is small, firms are with lower price level and higher technology level, and 
listing has little effects on technology of these firms. 
To sum it up, I use the number of investment banks in a city of the current and former 
years as instrument variables to examine the effects of listing on firm’s profitability and 
technology, and find listing increases firm’s profitability and technology. 
4.5 Robustness Results 
4.5.1 Potential Selection Bias 
Selection bias arise might be because new investment banks or branches are established 
in cities where there are more qualified listing firms. The number of investment banks 
in Table 4.1 is increasing from 90 in 1998 to more than 240 in 2007. Some new 
investment banks or new branches might select the locations where there are potential 
listing firms. Investment banks may help to improve profitability of firms who are at 
the margin of the requirements to be listed, even though with very low probability.  
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To tackle this problem of inverted selection of qualified firms and investment banks, I 
use the number of investment banks in a specific earlier year (1990 to 1998) as an 
instrument. Table 4.6 reports the results of the number of investment banks in the year 
1994 to 1998 on listing 14 . The coefficient in column (1) is significantly positive, 
indicating that the more of investment banks in a city in 1994, the more firms will be 
listed on a stock exchange during 1998 to 2007. Specifically, for each additional 
investment bank in a city, there will be two more firms out of 10,000 firms listed in a 
stock exchange in later years. The coefficients across columns (2) to (6) are all 
significantly positive, indicating that the more number of pre-determined investment 
banks in a city, the more of firms will be listed on a stock exchange. As there are only 
661 listed firms by the end of 2007, the initial number of investment banks had a large 
effect on later listing.  
Table 4.7 shows the results of the second-stage of listing on firm’s TFPR using the 
number of investment banks at a specific former year. The coefficients of the interaction 
across columns (1) to (5) are all significantly positive, which means with an extra 
investment bank in a city, more firms will be listed on a stock exchange in later years. 
Table 4.8 reports the results of the second-stage of listing on firm’s TFPQ with the 
number of investment bank at a specific former year as instrument variable when the 
elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 3. The coefficients of the interaction across 
columns (1) to (5) are all negative, but not significant. Table 4.9 includes the results of 
listing on a stock exchange on TFPQ when use a larger elasticity of substitution. 
Coefficients of the interaction when elasticity of substitution equaling 5 is not 
significant, and the coefficient is also insignificant when sigma equals to 7 and the 
number of investment bank in 1995 as instrument variable. When sigma equals to 10, 
the coefficients of the interaction are significantly positive with the number of 
investment bank in both 1995 and 1998. The effects of listing on TFPQ are similar with 
the result above when assuming different values to the elasticity of substitution. Listing 
has significantly positive effects on TFPQ of firms with lower TFPQ, and insignificant 
                                                   
14 The omitted results also show the number of investment banks at the years from 1990 to 1993 is good 
instrument for listing. 
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effects on TFPQ of firms with higher TFPQ values. 
4.5.2 Spillover Effects of Large Cities 
As investment banks have no or little connections with firms unless it’s because of 
listing, investment banks will not affect firm’s profitability or technology through other 
channels. However, using the number of investment banks as instrument may capture 
the spillover effects of large cities. As mentioned above, most of the investment banks 
or branches are located in the downtown areas of large cities. If firms in the large cities 
are more profitable and/or have higher technology due to stronger market demand, the 
coefficient will be biased upwards as they will capture the geographic effects of being 
in large cities. This is not likely to be a big problem, because first manufacturing firms 
are usually located in urban areas far away from the downtown. Second, manufacturing 
products produced away from large cities could also be sold to customers all over the 
country if they are competitive enough.  
To tackle the potential issue that the number of investment bank may capture the 
geographic effects of being close to large cities, I include a dummy variable referring 
to large cities and an interaction variable of after-listing and the dummy variable. 
Specifically, the dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is from the 31 capital cities of all 
provinces and 6 other large port cities, and 0 otherwise.  
Table 4.10 reports the results of listing on TFPR where I control for the geographic 
effects. I first only include the dummy variable of large cities as control variable in 
columns (1) to (4), and the results show that the coefficients of the interaction of listing 
and period dummy are still significantly positive, which is consistent with the 
conclusions above. Moreover, the coefficients of the dummy variable for large cities 
are significantly negative, indicating that firms in large cities usually have lower 
profitability. One possible explanation might be that more firms are in large cities, and 
the market is more competitive. Therefore, firms in large cities are with lower 
profitability. After controlling the interaction of the geographic dummy and period 
dummy, the coefficients of listing interaction are still significantly positive on firm’s 
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TFPR, but coefficients of the interaction between the period dummy and large city 
dummy are not significant. 
Moreover, I also estimate the effects of listing on TFPQ assuming the elasticity of 
substitution takes on different values, the results are in Table 4.11. Consistent with the 
conclusions above, listing has insignificant effects on firm’s TFPQ when sigma is set 
to be 3, and has significant effects on firm’s TFPQ when sigma is assumed to be larger, 
even after controlling the geographic effects. As TFPQ is computed from TFPR with 
equation (4.2), smaller (larger) sigma means a firm has higher (lower) technology but 
lower (higher) markup 15. Firms with higher technology might be associated with lower 
cost (Haltiwanger et al., 2018), which allows firms to charge lower prices. 
Therefore, after controlling the geographic effects that firms near to large cities might 
be more profitable and more technology-advanced, the coefficients to measure the 
effects of listing on profitability and technology (partly) are still significantly positive, 
indicating that listing has increased firm’s profitability and technology. 
4.5.3 SOE Reforms 
The estimated effect of listing in a stock exchange on firm’s profitability and 
technology may also capture the effects of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms. The 
SOE reforms started and mostly happened in 1998. The aim of the SOE reforms were 
to cut excessive production capacity and allow firms to transfer debt into equity in some 
industries. Meanwhile, most listed firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s are SOE. 
Hence, listing might capture the effects of SOE reforms. 
I add control variables of SOE reforms to examine if listing still has significant effects 
on firm’s profitability and technology. The data set includes information of firm’s 
ownership, based on which I construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of one 
if the firm is a SOE. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4.12 report the results of listing on 
profitability after controlling SOE reforms dummy variable. The coefficients of the 
interaction are still positive and significant, indicating that listing still has positive 
                                                   
15 As the quantity of products for firms is not available in the data, I check the results when sigma is set to be 
different values, and the results are consistent. 
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effects on profitability after controlling SOE reforms effects. However, the coefficients 
of the ownership dummy are all significantly negative, which means SOE had lower 
profitability than non-SOE over the period. Moreover, some SOE might change their 
ownership due to SOE reforms or listing. Thus, I also include the interaction between 
the period dummy and ownership dummy in columns (5) to (8). The results show that 
listing still has significantly positive effects on firm’s profitability after controlling for 
firm’s ownership. 
Moreover, I examine the effects of listing on firm’s technology. Like above, I assume 
different values for sigma in order to compute TFPQ. The estimation results for the 
effect of listing on TFPQ computed with different values of sigma are shown in Table 
4.13. Consistent with the previous results, I find that listing has no significant effects 
on firm’s TFPQ when sigma is set to be 3, but has significantly positive effects on TFPQ 
when sigma is set be to larger. However, the coefficients of ownership are all 
significantly negative across all columns, indicating that SOE have lower technology 
levels. 
4.5.4 Requirements of Listing on a Stock Exchange 
By the end of 2007, there are only two main boards on the stock market in Shanghai 
Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities Exchange respectively. The two main 
boards have the same requirements for firms to be listed on the stock market. 
Specifically, the requirements focus on firm’s (accumulative) profits, net cash flow and 
(accumulative) operational income. For example, one requirement states that firms 
qualified to be listed should have positive profits of the last 3 years consecutively, or 
the accumulative net profit should be larger than 30 million yuan. Therefore, investment 
banks might focus more on seeking large-size firms to help them to be listed and neglect 
small firms. I sort the data set into smaller subsamples based on profits as robustness 
check. Specifically, I first identify the top 25% value for firm’s profits in 1998, and then 
drop firms whose profit is lower than the top 25% value in 1998. The reason I use profit 
instead other variables such as net cash flow or income is because there is a large 
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amount of missing data for these variables.  
The results of listing on profitability and technology of the sample with qualified or 
potential qualified firms are reported in Table 4.14. I use the number of investment 
banks of current and former years as instrument variables respectively. Columns (1) to 
(4) show the effects of listing on TFPR. Consistent with the results above, the 
coefficients of the interaction are all significantly positive, indicating listing increases 
profitability. Columns (5) to (8) report the results of listing on TFPQ, which TFPQ is 
computed when the elasticity of substitution is set to be 3. The coefficients of the 
interaction are not significant. 
Robustness checks when TFPQ is computed with different values are reported in Table 
4.15. The coefficients of the interaction to measure effects of listing on TFPQ are all 
positive and significant, indicating that listing increases the technology level of firms 
with lower technology levels. Therefore, I still find consistent conclusions that listing 
increases firm’s profitability and technology with small sample of more qualified firms. 
4.6 Potential Channels 
Using Chinese firm level data, I find that listing on a stock exchange increases firm’s 
profitability and technology. In this section, I further discuss what other aspects of firms 
change after listing on a stock exchange. There are also many other variables about 
firm’s assets, liabilities, capital, and so on. Using the same specification as above, I 
replace the dependent variables with other variables depicting such as firm’s assets and 
liabilities, to examine the effects of listing on firm’s characteristics. 
The results of the effects of listing on firm’s asset, liabilities, capital, income, profit and 
cost, wages and welfare, and taxes and subsidies are reported in Table 4.16. Column (1) 
includes the name of variables, and column (2) reports the sign of the coefficients of 
the interaction. As to firm’s assets, listing significantly increases firm’s fixed assets and 
long-term investment, and decreases firm’s current assets and inventory. Moreover, 
listing reduces firm’s total assets.  
Listing decreases firm’s total liabilities as is shown in row (12), and mainly by reducing 
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current liabilities. However, listing increases firm’s long-term liabilities. The effects of 
listing on capital are interesting. After listing on a stock exchange, the state-owned 
capital, corporate capital and personal capital increase, but the Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan capital and foreign capital decrease.  
Listing does not increase outcomes such as sales value, export delivery value or main 
product sales revenue: in contrast, it leads to decrease in income. However, listing 
decreases operating profit and other profit. Listing decreases cost significantly, 
specifically, firm’s total loss, main product sales cost, intermediate input, operating 
expenses and management cost fall significantly. These results indicate that the increase 
in profit observed after firms list on a stock exchange is mainly due to the significant 
decrease of cost, rather than an increase in income.  
However, the effects of listing on wages and welfare are all negative as can be seen 
from rows (38) to (42). Specifically, after listing in a stock exchange, firm’s 
employment decreases, payroll payable and wages payable for main business decreases, 
and welfare and welfare payable for main business decreases too. Meanwhile, it’s 
interesting that taxes measured by different methods increase after listing on a stock 
exchange, but the subsidies firms received are not significantly affected. 
To sum up, listing changes the structure of firm’s assets, liabilities, and capital. After 
listing on a stock exchange, fixed assets and long-term investment increase, and current 
assets decrease too. Total liabilities and current liabilities decrease but long-term 
liabilities increase. And state-owned, corporate and personal capital increases, but 
foreign capital decreases. Moreover, both income and cost decrease, but profit increases. 
Wages and welfare do not change significantly after listing on a stock exchange, but 
taxes increased significantly. 
4.7 Key Findings 
I investigate the effects of listing on stock market on firm’s profitability and technology. 
After identifying the listed firms out of 2 million manufacturing firms across the years 
from 1998 to 2007, I compute revenue productivity and physical productivity to 
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measure firm’s profitability and technology. As Chinese stock exchanges require firms 
to be listed on the stock market need to be underwritten by investment banks, I use the 
number of investment banks in a city as instrument variable to tackle concerns 
regarding endogeneity of listing. With difference-in-difference model, I find that listing 
on the stock market increases firm’s profitability and technology. After controlling 
variables of geographic effects and SOE reforms, the results are still significant. 
Moreover, besides profitability and technology, firm’s many other characteristics are 
affected by listing on a stock exchange. For example, listing increases firm’s fixed 
assets, long-term liabilities, state-owned, corporate and personal capital, and profits, 
but decreases current assets, short liabilities, foreign capital and cost. In addition, wages 
and welfare decrease, and taxes increase. Future study may look further at the 
mechanism about how does listing affect firm’s profitability and technology.
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4.8 Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Listing and Non-Listing Firms 
Variable 
TFPR TFPQ No. of 
listed firms 
No. of 
investment 
bank Listed Non-listed Listed Non-listed 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1998 
7.213 
(12.66) 
8.150 
(20.11) 
3172.2 
(8482.9) 
694.5 
(3042.9) 
299 90 
2003 
5.834 
(5.11) 
9.859 
(34.55) 
3594.1 
(5974.3) 
1039.5 
(5423.5) 
500 178 
2007 
7.539 
(10.96) 
12.102 
(60.97) 
5322.9 
(9964.1) 
1736.1 
(15736.1) 
661 243 
Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses in columns (1) to (4). No. of listed firms refers to 
the number of listed firms by the end of the year, and No. of investment bank refers to the number 
of investment banks by the end of the year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: First Stage Regressions Result of Listing on the Number of Investment Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Listing 
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-0) 
2.25e-05***      
(3.96e-06)      
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-1) 
 2.19e-05***     
 (4.02e-06)     
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-2) 
  2.20e-05***    
  (4.09e-06)    
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-3) 
   2.30e-05***   
   (4.25e-06)   
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-4) 
    2.34e-05***  
    (4.53e-06)  
NO. of Inv. Bank (t-5) 
     2.51e-05*** 
     (4.94e-06) 
Constant 
0.000795** 0.000902*** 0.000972*** 0.00104*** 0.00115*** 0.00121*** 
(0.000325) (0.000320) (0.000318) (0.000314) (0.000311) (0.000308) 
Observations 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: NO. of Inv. Bank (t-0) refers to the number of investment banks in a city where firms are located in at the current year. And NO. of Inv. Bank (t-1) refers to the 
number of investment bank in a city one year ago. Control variables include firm’s age and size, which age is measured by year and size is measured by firm’s value-
added. The count variable of the number of investment banks might affect the results, I also use the number of investment banks per firm in a city as robustness checks, 
the results are consistent. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3: Effects of Listing on a Stock Exchange on Firm’s TFPR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) N(t-4) N(t-5) 
Listing 
-1,638*** -1,614*** -1,527*** -1,567*** -1,640*** -1,707*** 
(329.2) (331.6) (311.4) (319.7) (336.5) (371.9) 
Post*Listing 
1,627*** 1,604*** 1,517*** 1,557*** 1,629*** 1,696*** 
(328.0) (330.4) (310.2) (318.5) (335.2) (370.4) 
Age 
-0.00281*** -0.00281*** -0.00281*** -0.00281*** -0.00282*** -0.00282*** 
(0.000493) (0.000488) (0.000470) (0.000479) (0.000494) (0.000508) 
Value-added 
6.74e-06*** 6.66e-06*** 6.39e-06*** 6.51e-06*** 6.74e-06*** 6.94e-06*** 
(1.28e-06) (1.28e-06) (1.21e-06) (1.24e-06) (1.29e-06) (1.39e-06) 
Constant 
16.11 16.10*** 16.05*** 16.07*** 16.11*** 16.15*** 
(0.368) (0.370) (0.357) (0.368) (0.377) (0.393) 
Observations 2003774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.5322 -0.516 -0.460 -0.486 -0.533 -0.579 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year 
lead. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. The count variable of the number of 
investment banks might affect the results, I also use the number of investment banks per firm in a city as robustness checks, the results are 
consistent. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.4: Effects of Listing on a Stock Exchange on Firm’s TFPQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (Sigma=3) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) N(t-4) N(t-5) 
Listing 
-7,661 -15,343 1,626 -14,915 -45,149 -30,795 
(131,298) (140,931) (138,348) (152,049) (147,791) (160,898) 
Post*Listing 
6,177 13,849 -2,946 13,692 43,948 29,939 
(131,352) (140,927) (138,398) (152,018) (147,792) (160,884) 
Age 
-0.219*** -0.220*** -0.219*** -0.221*** -0.224*** -0.223*** 
(0.0519) (0.0527) (0.0522) (0.0530) (0.0537) (0.0527) 
Value-added 
0.00662*** 0.00665*** 0.00659*** 0.00664*** 0.00673*** 0.00667*** 
(0.000664) (0.000673) (0.000648) (0.000658) (0.000655) (0.000624) 
Constant 
1,317*** 1,322*** 1,312*** 1,321*** 1,339*** 1,330*** 
(102.1) (107.0) (107.7) (114.1) (112.1) (119.2) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year 
lead. TFPQ is computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the 
over-identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. The count variable of the number of investment banks might affect 
the results, I also use the number of investment banks per firm in a city as robustness checks, the results are consistent. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Robustness Check of Effects of Listing on Firm’s TFPQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (sigma=5) TFPQ (sigma=7) TFPQ (sigma=10) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) 
Listing 
-13,004*** -13,344*** -6,920*** -6,935*** -4,202*** -4,142*** 
(3,935) (4,386) (1,647) (1,744) (911.8) (931.7) 
Post*Listing 
12,907*** 13,250*** 6,873*** 6,889*** 4,175*** 4,115*** 
(3,926) (4,375) (1,641) (1,739) (908.6) (928.3) 
Age 
-0.0238*** -0.0238*** -0.0120*** -0.0120*** -0.00717*** -0.00717*** 
(0.00472) (0.00479) (0.00229) (0.00230) (0.00133) (0.00132) 
Value-added 
0.000183*** 0.000184*** 6.17e-05*** 6.17e-05*** 2.78e-05*** 2.76e-05*** 
(2.11e-05) (2.13e-05) (7.95e-06) (7.96e-06) (4.02e-06) (3.99e-06) 
Constant 
142.4*** 142.6*** 70.26*** 70.27*** 41.58*** 41.54*** 
(4.291) (4.618) (1.876) (1.970) (1.041) (1.074) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.085 -0.090 -0.177 -0.178 -0.277 -0.269 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year 
lead. TFPQ is computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the 
over-identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: First Stage Results of Listing on the Number of Investment Banks at Specific Early Years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Listing 
NO. of Inv. Bank at 1994 
0.000202***     
(3.45e-05)     
NO. of Inv. Bank at 1995 
 4.51e-05***    
 (6.81e-06)    
NO. of Inv. Bank at 1996 
  3.94e-05***   
  (5.90e-06)   
NO. of Inv. Bank at 1997 
   3.38e-05***  
   (5.58e-06)  
NO. of Inv. Bank at 1998 
    3.21e-05*** 
    (5.44e-06) 
Constant 
0.00145*** 0.00104*** 0.00110*** 0.00112*** 0.00113*** 
(0.000305) (0.000311) (0.000310) (0.000310) (0.000310) 
Observations 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 2,003,775 
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: NO. of Inv. Bank at 1994 refers to the number of investment bank in a city in the year 1994. All regressions passed the over-
identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: Effects of Listing on TFPR with the Number of Investment Banks at Early Years as Instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Instrument N(1994) N(1995) N(1996) N(1997) N(1998) 
Listing 
-1,604*** -561.5*** -538.4*** -923.0*** -991.0*** 
(341.3) (152.3) (148.4) (221.8) (238.6) 
Post*Listing 
1,594*** 557.1*** 534.0*** 916.9*** 984.6*** 
(339.9) (151.7) (147.8) (221.0) (237.6) 
Age 
-0.00281*** -0.00272*** -0.00272*** -0.00276*** -0.00276*** 
(0.000486) (0.000307) (0.000304) (0.000358) (0.000369) 
Value-added 
6.64e-06*** 3.32e-06*** 3.25e-06*** 4.46e-06*** 4.67e-06*** 
(1.30e-06) (6.83e-07) (6.71e-07) (8.92e-07) (9.42e-07) 
Constant 
16.09*** 15.48*** 15.47*** 15.69*** 15.73*** 
(0.371) (0.253) (0.252) (0.288) (0.296) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.510 -0.048 -0.042 -0.157 -0.184 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(1994) refers to the number of investment bank in a city at the year 1994. All regressions passed the over-
identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8: Effects of Listing on TFPQ with the Number of Investment Banks at Early Years as Instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (Sigma=3) 
Instrument N(1994) N(1995) N(1996) N(1997) N(1998) 
Listing 
106,846 189,933 191,536 176,053 175,265 
(123,876) (132,839) (132,324) (141,771) (144,029) 
Post*Listing 
-108,248 -188,626 -190,265 -175,016 -174,341 
(124,016) (132,905) (132,393) (141,787) (144,037) 
Age 
-0.208*** -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.208*** -0.208*** 
(0.0579) (0.0699) (0.0702) (0.0677) (0.0676) 
Value-added 
0.00628*** 0.00595*** 0.00594*** 0.00600*** 0.00600*** 
(0.000645) (0.000629) (0.000629) (0.000622) (0.000620) 
Constant 
1,251*** 1,200*** 1,199*** 1,208*** 1,209*** 
(104.1) (110.1) (109.9) (113.3) (114.4) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.005 -0.027 -0.027 -0.022 -0.022 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(1994) refers to the number of investment bank in a city at the year 1994. All regressions passed the over-identification 
test, under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9: Robustness Check of Effects of Listing on TFPQ with the Number of Investment Banks at Early Years as Instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TFPQ(sigma=5) TFPQ(sigma=7) TFPQ(sigma=10) 
Instrument N(1995) N(1998) N(1995) N(1998) N(1995) N(1998) 
Listing 
891.5 -2,339 -849.3 -2,563** -919.6** -1,974*** 
(2,864) (3,190) (938.3) (1,155) (451.6) (618.6) 
Post*Listing 
-878.2 2,331 844.5 2,548** 912.9** 1,962*** 
(2,862) (3,186) (936.7) (1,152) (450.4) (616.5) 
Age 
-0.0227*** -0.0229*** -0.0115*** -0.0116*** -0.00690*** -0.00699*** 
(0.00340) (0.00345) (0.00150) (0.00162) (0.000842) (0.000950) 
Value-added 
0.000138*** 0.000149*** 4.22e-05*** 4.77e-05*** 1.73e-05*** 2.07e-05*** 
(1.68e-05) (1.73e-05) (5.58e-06) (6.07e-06) (2.53e-06) (2.96e-06) 
Constant 
134.2*** 136.1*** 66.69*** 67.70*** 39.65*** 40.27*** 
(3.750) (3.842) (1.475) (1.559) (0.769) (0.841) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared 0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.016 -0.002 -0.052 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(1995) refers to the number of investment bank in a city at the year 1995. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-
identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.10: Effects of Listing on TFPR with Controlling Geographic Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) 
Listing -1,400*** -1,378*** -1,291*** -1,343*** -1,403*** -1,382*** -1,293*** -1,345*** 
 (310.3) (314.2) (293.1) (304.2) (314.0) (318.2) (296.7) (308.2) 
Post*Listing 1,390*** 1,369*** 1,282*** 1,334*** 1,384*** 1,361*** 1,277*** 1,329*** 
 (309.2) (313.0) (292.0) (303.0) (304.7) (307.9) (286.4) (296.1) 
LargeCity -0.244** -0.246** -0.257** -0.251** -0.260** -0.265** -0.269** -0.262** 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.121) 
Post* LargeCity     9.864 11.59 7.811 7.029 
     (28.98) (31.73) (34.55) (40.82) 
Age -0.00279*** -0.00279*** -0.00278*** -0.00278*** -0.00277*** -0.00277*** -0.00277*** -0.00277*** 
 (0.000445) (0.000440) (0.000423) (0.000434) (0.000448) (0.000444) (0.000428) (0.000440) 
Value-added 6.00e-06*** 5.94e-06*** 5.66e-06*** 5.82e-06*** 6.15e-06*** 6.11e-06*** 5.78e-06*** 5.93e-06*** 
 (1.18e-06) (1.18e-06) (1.10e-06) (1.14e-06) (1.38e-06) (1.41e-06) (1.36e-06) (1.46e-06) 
Constant 16.19*** 16.18*** 16.14*** 16.16*** 16.19*** 16.18*** 16.14*** 16.17*** 
 (0.337) (0.339) (0.327) (0.339) (0.339) (0.341) (0.329) (0.341) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.384 -0.372 -0.324 -0.352 -0.386 -0.374 -0.325 -0.353 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year lead. TFPQ is 
computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-
identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.11: Effects of Listing on TFPQ with Controlling Geographic Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (sigma=3) TFPQ (sigma=5) TFPQ (sigma=7) TFPQ (sigma=10) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) 
Listing -66,882 -66,191 -14,600*** -14,787*** -7,067*** -7,060*** -4,026*** -3,972*** 
 (141,618) (165,120) (4,503) (4,991) (1,819) (1,931) (962.2) (990.1) 
Post*Listing 48,888 57,977 13,955*** 14,240*** 6,841*** 6,851*** 3,926*** 3,876*** 
 (145,463) (169,385) (4,460) (4,932) (1,782) (1,882) (937.7) (958.1) 
LargeCity 28.34 44.08 0.560 0.743 -0.203 -0.177 -0.325 -0.324 
 (51.03) (66.00) (2.028) (2.413) (0.782) (0.896) (0.392) (0.435) 
Post* LargeCity 16,540 6,859 550.4 452.0 180.8 164.7 74.30 69.94 
 (23,997) (34,830) (767.9) (1,123) (264.6) (385.9) (120.3) (174.2) 
Age -0.195*** -0.214** -0.0229*** -0.0231*** -0.0116*** -0.0117*** -0.00701*** -0.00702*** 
 (0.0718) (0.0866) (0.00521) (0.00547) (0.00237) (0.00243) (0.00131) (0.00133) 
Value-added 0.00703*** 0.00689*** 0.000196*** 0.000195*** 6.46e-05*** 6.44e-05*** 2.83e-05*** 2.80e-05*** 
 (0.000777) (0.000880) (2.58e-05) (2.94e-05) (9.59e-06) (1.08e-05) (4.73e-06) (5.22e-06) 
Constant 1,306*** 1,303*** 142.1*** 142.2*** 70.30*** 70.29*** 41.67*** 41.65*** 
 (97.77) (108.3) (4.424) (4.703) (1.896) (1.980) (1.024) (1.056) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 -0.109 -0.112 -0.185 -0.185 -0.254 -0.246 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year lead. TFPQ is 
computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, 
under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.12: Effects of Listing on TFPR with Controlling SOE Reforms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) 
Listing -1,714*** -1,682*** -1,582*** -1,609*** -1,714*** -1,682*** -1,582*** -1,609*** 
 (345.1) (346.0) (322.6) (328.1) (345.1) (346.0) (322.6) (328.1) 
Post*Listing 1,702*** 1,671*** 1,571*** 1,598*** 1,703*** 1,671*** 1,571*** 1,598*** 
 (343.8) (344.7) (321.3) (326.8) (343.8) (344.7) (321.3) (326.8) 
SOE Reform -3.362*** -3.349*** -3.306*** -3.318*** -3.358*** -3.345*** -3.302*** -3.313*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.195) (0.197) (0.207) (0.206) (0.196) (0.198) 
Post* SOE 
Reform 
    -1.704 -1.644 -1.731 -1.781 
    (1.270) (1.309) (1.308) (1.362) 
Age -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.00170*** 
 (0.000505) (0.000498) (0.000477) (0.000482) (0.000505) (0.000498) (0.000477) (0.000482) 
Value-added 7.08e-06*** 6.99e-06*** 6.67e-06*** 6.76e-06*** 7.09e-06*** 7.00e-06*** 6.68e-06*** 6.77e-06*** 
 (1.34e-06) (1.33e-06) (1.25e-06) (1.27e-06) (1.34e-06) (1.33e-06) (1.25e-06) (1.27e-06) 
Constant 17.72*** 17.70*** 17.62*** 17.64*** 17.72*** 17.69*** 17.62*** 17.64*** 
 (0.429) (0.430) (0.410) (0.421) (0.429) (0.430) (0.411) (0.421) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared -0.583 -0.562 -0.495 -0.512 -0.584 -0.562 -0.495 -0.512 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year lead. TFPQ is 
computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-
identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.13: Effects of Listing on TFPQ with Controlling SOE Reforms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (sigma=3) TFPQ (sigma=5) TFPQ (sigma=7) TFPQ (sigma=10) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) 
Listing -16,719 -20,079 -13,850*** -13,818*** -7,313*** -7,154*** -4,423*** -4,264*** 
 (132,500) (152,810) (4,070) (4,457) (1,719) (1,782) (955.2) (954.5) 
Post*Listing 15,192 18,834 13,746*** 13,720*** 7,263*** 7,106*** 4,393*** 4,236*** 
 (132,542) (152,770) (4,059) (4,445) (1,713) (1,776) (951.7) (951.0) 
SOE -396.3*** -396.9*** -37.54*** -37.51*** -17.47*** -17.40*** -9.805*** -9.736*** 
 (64.05) (70.05) (2.555) (2.627) (1.084) (1.087) (0.593) (0.584) 
Post* SOE -1,028 -1,316 -33.26 -38.10 -12.04 -13.24 -5.821 -6.238 
 (967.1) (1,084) (30.27) (33.96) (10.56) (11.76) (4.902) (5.406) 
Age -0.0863* -0.0869* -0.0112** -0.0112** -0.00614*** -0.00615*** -0.00390*** -0.00391*** 
 (0.0516) (0.0515) (0.00480) (0.00479) (0.00234) (0.00231) (0.00136) (0.00133) 
Value-added 0.00667*** 0.00667*** 0.000188*** 0.000187*** 6.36e-05*** 6.31e-05*** 2.89e-05*** 2.84e-05*** 
 (0.000667) (0.000660) (2.16e-05) (2.16e-05) (8.19e-06) (8.11e-06) (4.17e-06) (4.08e-06) 
Constant 1,507*** 1,509*** 160.3*** 160.3*** 78.62*** 78.49*** 46.27*** 46.15*** 
 (118.1) (134.5) (4.813) (5.192) (2.134) (2.225) (1.197) (1.219) 
Observations 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 2,003,774 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 -0.097 -0.097 -0.199 -0.190 -0.308 -0.285 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year lead. TFPQ is 
computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-
identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.14: Effects of Listing on TFPR and TFPQ with Potential Qualified Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TFPR TFPQ (Sigma=3) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-1) N(t-2) N(t-3) 
Listing -429.5*** -417.7*** -375.1*** -356.7*** -30,231 -30,774 -27,276 -27,072 
 (134.0) (131.8) (117.1) (109.8) (22,460) (22,724) (21,250) (19,869) 
Post*Listing 423.4*** 411.7*** 369.6*** 351.5*** 30,659 31,267 27,945 27,930 
 (132.7) (130.4) (115.9) (108.7) (22,128) (22,381) (20,904) (19,510) 
Age -0.00230** -0.00228** -0.00221** -0.00218** -0.151 -0.152 -0.147 -0.147 
 (0.00111) (0.00110) (0.00105) (0.00103) (0.130) (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) 
Value-added 1.96e-06*** 1.92e-06*** 1.74e-06*** 1.67e-06*** 0.00395*** 0.00394*** 0.00393*** 0.00392*** 
 (5.85e-07) (5.75e-07) (5.13e-07) (4.84e-07) (0.000352) (0.000352) (0.000349) (0.000348) 
Constant 15.78*** 15.76*** 15.70*** 15.68*** 2,001*** 2,002*** 1,996*** 1,994*** 
 (0.661) (0.653) (0.619) (0.605) (128.3) (129.5) (128.3) (128.5) 
Observations 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 
R-squared -0.501 -0.472 -0.375 -0.337 0.013 0.011 0.021 0.022 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment bank one-year lead. TFPQ is 
computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-
identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.15: Robustness Check of Effects of Listing on TFPQ with Potential Qualified Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TFPQ (sigma=5) TFPQ (sigma=7) TFPQ (sigma=10) 
Instrument N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) N(t-0) N(t-3) 
Listing -4,336*** -3,679*** -2,100*** -1,767*** -1,205*** -1,009*** 
 (1,589) (1,347) (714.0) (597.9) (394.2) (327.5) 
Post*Listing 4,307*** 3,665*** 2,079*** 1,752*** 1,191*** 998.1*** 
 (1,572) (1,331) (706.6) (591.3) (390.2) (324.0) 
Age -0.0193 -0.0182 -0.00984* -0.00929* -0.00591* -0.00558* 
 (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.00554) (0.00518) (0.00315) (0.00293) 
Value-added 8.22e-05*** 7.92e-05*** 2.45e-05*** 2.31e-05*** 9.99e-06*** 9.18e-06*** 
 (9.52e-06) (8.72e-06) (3.61e-06) (3.17e-06) (1.85e-06) (1.58e-06) 
Constant 167.1*** 166.2*** 77.52*** 77.06*** 43.92*** 43.66*** 
 (8.095) (7.694) (3.569) (3.340) (1.955) (1.811) 
Observations 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 224,306 
R-squared -0.246 -0.170 -0.333 -0.229 -0.396 -0.270 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: N(t-0) refers to the number of investment bank of a city at the current year, and N(t-1) refers to the number of investment 
bank one-year lead. TFPQ is computed from TFPR by assuming sigma equal to different values, in which above sigma is set to 
be 3. All regressions passed the over-identification test, under-identification test and weak identification test. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.16: Effects of Listing on Firm’s Characteristics 
(1) (2) 
Variables Beta of Post*Listing 
Assets  
(1) Total assets Negative 
(2) Fixed assets Positive 
(3) Production use of (2) Positive 
(4) Annual average of net fixed assets Positive 
(5) Intangible assets Positive 
(6) Current assets Negative 
(7) Accounts receivable Negative 
(8) Inventory Negative 
(9) Final goods of (8) Negative 
(10) Annual average of (6) Negative 
(11) Long-term investment Positive 
Liabilities  
(12) Total liabilities Negative 
(13) Long-term liabilities Positive 
(14) Current liabilities Negative 
Capital  
(15) Total equity Not significant 
(16) Paid-in capital Negative 
(17) State-owned capital Positive 
(18) Corporate capital Positive 
(19) Personal capital Positive 
(20) Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan capital Negative 
(21) Foreign capital Negative 
Income, Profit and Cost  
(22) Sales value Negative 
(23) Export delivery value Negative 
(24) Main product sales revenue Negative 
(25) Sales profit Not significant 
(26) Other profit Positive 
(27) Operating profit Positive 
(28) Total loss Negative 
(29) Payable profit Negative 
(30) Main product sales cost Negative 
(31) Intermediate input Negative 
(32) Operating expenses Negative 
(33) Management cost Negative 
(34) Taxes and surcharges of (33) Positive 
(35) Property insurance of (33) Not significant 
(36) Financial expenses Positive 
(37) Interest expenses Positive 
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Wages and Welfare  
(38) Total employment Negative 
(39) Total payroll payable Negative 
(40) Total wages payable for main business Negative 
(41) Total welfare payable Negative 
(42) Welfare payable for main business Negative 
(43) Unemployment insurance Not significant 
Taxes and Subsidies  
(44) Taxes for main business sales Positive 
(45) Total taxes Positive 
(46) Income tax payable Positive 
(47) VAT Positive 
(48) Input tax Positive 
(49) Output tax Positive 
(50) Subsidy Not significant 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Chapter 1 Appendix 
A.1.1 Five Year Plans 
The Five Year Plans are the most important industrial policies used to guide investment 
and economic activities in China. The Chinese central government issued the first Five 
Year Plan in 1953, which sought to promote different industries by making specific 
investment plans and establishing growth objectives for each industry. The first Five 
Year Plans sought to establish a variety of industries in China during a period when the 
economy was centrally controlled and closed. However, since the policy of "grasping 
the large and letting go of the small" was enacted in 1997, a movement towards 
privatization has taken place. Moreover, the Five Year Plans have shifted towards a 
more general outline regarding the investment and development aims for all industries. 
While the stated objective of these Five Year Plans is to provide guidance regarding 
economic development and investment in the following five years, it is unclear whether 
these policies have been successful in attaining their objectives. Whereas the policies 
are designed by the central government, local governments are in charge of the 
implementation. 
As mentioned above, the Five Year Plans are proposed and approved by the State 
Council, which is the central Chinese government. However, given that the number of 
firms owned by the central government is small relative to the total number of firms in 
the economy, direct support to particular firms is limited. 
Local governments at provincial, county, and district levels are the key to the 
completion of the Five Year Plans. Therefore, the central government urges local 
governments to support the target firms and industries. Local governments are asked to 
make regional development plans based on the Five Year Plan. The central government 
conducts mid-term and final examinations, and the results of these examination are used 
as one of the promotion indicators for local officers. Therefore, local governments have 
a clear incentive to support the target firms and industries using various methods such 
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as fiscal and financial supports, tax reduction, selling products for firms, helping firms 
establish branches. 
The natural question then to ask would be why are these industries supported by the 
10th Five Year Plans? There is no direct evidence to show why are these industries 
supported, and the original official documents only give abstract reasons. The main 
theme for the development of manufacturing industries of the 10th Five Year Plan is to 
improve technology level by adopting the new technology advances of the new round 
world technology revolution, and to transform the economic structure. The Five Year 
Plan supports some industries of raw materials is because the industrial structure of 
these sectors needs to be optimized, which these industries include textile, paper and 
paper products manufacturing, and so on. Local governments are asked to help firms in 
these raw material industries to produce with less energy use and less pollution emission 
by adopting new high technology. Moreover, some high-tech sectors are supported by 
the 10th Five Year Plan is because of the improvement of technology level of foreign 
firms. For example, the official statement claims that equipment manufacturing is 
supported by the Five Year Plan is because the central government encourage these 
industries to adopt hi-tech from foreign firms. For some industries like satellite 
manufacturing, China has already had more advanced technology than most of other 
countries, the 10th Five Year Plan still supports it. In addition, some industries are 
supported since the very first Five Year Plan are also supported by the 10th Five Year 
Plan, such as steel and energy, because they are taken basic and important industries for 
economic development and national defense. 
 
 
A.1.2 Anticipated Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan 
If misallocation led to the support provided by the 10th Five Year Plan rather than vice 
versa, then the estimates discussed in the previous section would obscure this reverse 
causality. As we mentioned earlier, the descriptive statistics reported in 1 suggest that 
the Chinese government did not target industries that had more misallocation. Note how 
the mean of var(logTFPR) for supported and not supported industries was similar in the 
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year 2000. This similarity is present in other measures of dispersion such as the 
interdecile range, 90th – 10th, and the interquartile range, 75th – 25th. Moreover, the aims 
expressed by the government for the 10th Five Year Plan do not explicitly touch on the 
question of misallocation. Instead, the general objective was to foster economic growth 
and improve international competitiveness. To further explore this issue, A.4 reports 
estimates for the model in Equation (2.5) augmented with leads of the industrial policy. 
More precisely, we add indicator variables for one, 2000×Supported, and two, 
1999×Supported, years before the adoption of the plan. The adoption leads are 
statistically insignificant, showing little evidence that the 10th Five Year Plan was 
anticipated by the industries it supported. 
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Table A.1.1: Supported and Not Supported Industries by Five Year Plans 
4-digit 
code 
Industry 
By the 
9th FYP 
By the 
10th FYP 
< 10 in a 
single year 
Treated Group 
1310 Grain grinding No Yes No 
1320 Feed processing No Yes No 
1331 Edible vegeoil processing No Yes No 
1332 Non-edible vegeoil processing No Yes No 
1340 Sugar production No Yes No 
1391 Starch and starch products manufacturing No Yes No 
1392 Soy products manufacturing No Yes No 
1393 Egg processing No Yes No 
1399 Other agricultural and sideline products processing No Yes No 
1711 Cotton, chemical fiber textile processing No Yes No 
1712 Cotton, chemical fiber printing and dyeing finishing No Yes No 
1721 Top processing No Yes No 
1722 Wool textile No Yes No 
1723 Wool dyeing and finishing No Yes No 
1730 Hemp textile No Yes No 
1741 Reeling processing No Yes No 
1742 Silk spinning and silk processing No Yes No 
1743 Silk screen dyeing finishing No Yes No 
1751 Cotton and chemical fiber products manufacturing No Yes No 
1752 Wool products manufacturing No Yes No 
1753 Hemp products manufacturing No Yes No 
1754 Silk products manufacturing No Yes No 
1755 Rope and cable manufacturing No Yes No 
1756 Woven and cord fabric manufacturing No Yes No 
1759 Other textile products manufacturing No Yes No 
1761 Cotton, chemical fiber knitwear and fabricated products manufacturing No Yes No 
1762 Wool knitwear and fabricated products manufacturing No Yes No 
1763 Silk knitwear and fabricated products manufacturing No Yes No 
1769 Other knitwear and fabricated products manufacturing No Yes No 
1810 Textile and garment manufacturing No Yes No 
1910 Leather tanning processing No Yes No 
1931 Fur tanning processing No Yes No 
2210 Pulp manufacturing No Yes No 
2221 Mechanism paper and paperboard manufacturing No Yes No 
2223 Processed paper manufacturing No Yes No 
2231 Paper and cardboard containers manufacturing No Yes No 
2621 Nitrogen fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
2622 Phosphate fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
2623 Potash fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
2624 Compound fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
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2625 Organic and microbial fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
2629 Other fertilizer manufacturing No Yes No 
2710 Chemical original drug manufacturing No Yes No 
2720 Chemical preparations manufacturing No Yes No 
2730 Chinese medicine Pieces processing No Yes No 
2760 Biological and biochemical products manufacturing No Yes No 
2770 Health materials and medical supplies manufacturing No Yes No 
2811 Chemical pulp manufacturing No Yes No 
2812 Man-made fiber manufacturing No Yes No 
2911 Vehicles, aircraft and machinery tires manufacturing No Yes No 
2912 Power tire manufacturing No Yes No 
2913 Tire refurbishment No Yes No 
2920 Rubber sheet, tube, and belt manufacturing No Yes No 
2930 Rubber parts manufacturing No Yes No 
2940 Recycled rubber manufacturing No Yes No 
2950 Daily and medical rubber products manufacturing No Yes No 
2960 Rubber boots manufacturing No Yes No 
2990 Other rubber products manufacturing No Yes No 
3010 Plastic film manufacturing No Yes No 
3020 Plastic plate, tube, and profile manufacturing No Yes No 
3030 Plastic wire, rope and knitwear manufacturing No Yes No 
3040 Foam manufacturing No Yes No 
3082 Daily plastic sundry goods manufacturing No Yes No 
3090 Other plastic products manufacturing No Yes No 
3111 Cement manufacturing No Yes No 
3513 Turbine and auxiliary equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
3615 Metallurgical equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
3641 Pulp and paper special equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
3653 Sewing machine manufacturing No Yes No 
3671 Tractor manufacturing No Yes No 
3672 Mechanized agricultural and gardening equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
3674 Animal husbandry machinery manufacturing No Yes No 
3675 Fishery machinery manufacturing No Yes No 
3676 Agricultural machinery accessories manufacturing No Yes No 
3679 Other agricultural machinery manufacturing No Yes No 
3711 Railway rolling stock and EMU manufacturing No Yes No 
3712 Special rail vehicles manufacturing No Yes No 
3713 Railway rolling stock accessories manufacturing No Yes No 
3714 Railway special equipment and accessories manufacturing No Yes No 
3719 Other railway equipment manufacturing and equipment repair No Yes No 
3751 Metal ship manufacturing No Yes No 
3752 Non-metallic ship manufacturing No Yes No 
3754 Marine equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
3755 Ship repair and shipbreaking No Yes No 
112 
 
3761 Aircraft manufacturing and repair No Yes No 
4071 Home video equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
4072 Home audio equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
4090 Other electronic equipment manufacturing No Yes No 
Control Group 
1351 Livestock and poultry slaughter No No No 
1352 Meat products and by-product processing No No No 
1361 Aquatic product freezing processing No No No 
1362 Dry processing of surimi products and aquatic products No No No 
1363 Aquatic feed manufacturing No No No 
1411 Pastry, bread making No No No 
1419 Biscuits and other baked goods manufacturing No No No 
1421 Candy, chocolate making No No No 
1422 Candied production making No No No 
1431 Rice and flour products manufacturing No No No 
1432 Frozen food manufacturing No No No 
1440 Liquid milk and dairy products manufacturing No No No 
1451 Meat and poultry canning No No No 
1452 Aquatic product canning No No No 
1453 Vegeand fruit canning No No No 
1459 Other foods canning No No No 
1461 MSG manufacturing No No No 
1462 Soy sauce, vinegar and similar products manufacturing No No No 
1469 Other condiments, fermented products manufacturing No No No 
1492 Frozen drinks and edible ice manufacturing No No No 
1493 Salt processing No No No 
1494 Food and feed additive manufacturing No No No 
1499 Other unspecified food manufacturing No No No 
1510 Alcohol manufacturing No No No 
1521 Liquor manufacturing No No No 
1522 Beer manufacturing No No No 
1523 Yellow wine manufacturing No No No 
1524 Wine making No No No 
1529 Other wine making No No No 
1531 Carbonated beverage manufacturing No No No 
1532 Bottle (can) drinking water manufacturing No No No 
1533 Fruit and vegejuice and fruit and vegejuice beverage manufacturing No No No 
1535 Solid beverage manufacturing No No No 
1539 Tea beverages and other soft drink manufacturing No No No 
1540 Refined tea processing No No No 
1610 Tobacco leaf re-baking No No No 
1620 Cigarette manufacturing No No No 
1690 Other tobacco products processing No No No 
1820 Textile shoes manufacturing No No No 
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1830 Cap manufacturing No No No 
1921 Leather shoes manufacturing No No No 
1922 Leather garment manufacturing No No No 
1923 Luggage, bag manufacturing No No No 
1929 Other leather products manufacturing No No No 
1932 Fur garment processing No No No 
1939 Other fur products processing No No No 
1941 Feather (velvet) processing No No No 
1942 Feather (velvet) products processing No No No 
2011 Sawn processing No No No 
2012 Wood chip processing No No No 
2021 Plywood manufacturing No No No 
2022 Fiberboard manufacturing No No No 
2023 Particleboard manufacturing No No No 
2029 Other wood-based panels and materials manufacturing No No No 
2031 Construction timber and wood component processing No No No 
2032 Wood container manufacturing No No No 
2039 Cork products and other wood products manufacturing No No No 
2040 Bamboo, rattan, palm and grass products manufacturing No No No 
2110 Wooden furniture manufacturing No No No 
2120 Bamboo and rattan furniture manufacturing No No No 
2130 Metal furniture manufacturing No No No 
2190 Other furniture manufacturing No No No 
2311 Book, newspaper, publication No No No 
2312 Booklet printing No No No 
2319 Packaging and other printing No No No 
2320 Binding and other printing service activities No No No 
2330 Copy of recording medium No No No 
2411 Stationery manufacturing No No No 
2412 Pen manufacturing No No No 
2413 Teaching model and teaching aid manufacturing No No No 
2419 Other stationery manufacturing No No No 
2421 Ball manufacturing No No No 
2422 Sports equipment and accessories manufacturing No No No 
2431 Chinese musical instrument manufacturing No No No 
2432 Western musical instrument manufacturing No No No 
2433 Electronic musical instrument manufacturing No No No 
2439 Other instruments and parts manufacturing No No No 
2440 Toy manufacturing No No No 
2451 Open-air playground amusement equipment manufacturing No No No 
2452 Entertainment and indoor amusement equipment manufacturing No No No 
2611 Inorganic acid manufacturing No No No 
2612 Inorganic alkali manufacturing No No No 
2613 Inorganic salt manufacturing No No No 
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2614 Organic chemical raw material manufacturing No No No 
3112 Lime and gypsum manufacturing No No No 
3121 Cement product manufacturing No No No 
3122 Structural component manufacturing No No No 
3123 Asbestos cement products manufacturing No No No 
3124 Lightweight building materials manufacturing No No No 
3129 Other cement products manufacturing No No No 
3131 Clay brick and building block manufacturing No No No 
3133 Construction stone processing No No No 
3134 Waterproof building materials manufacturing No No No 
3135 Insulation and sound insulation materials manufacturing No No No 
3139 Other building materials manufacturing No No No 
3141 Flat glass manufacturing No No No 
3142 Technical glass manufacturing No No No 
3143 Optical glass manufacturing No No No 
3144 Glass instrument manufacturing No No No 
3145 Daily glass products and glass packaging containers manufacturing No No No 
3147 Glass fiber and related product manufacturing No No No 
3148 Glass fiber reinforced plastic products manufacturing No No No 
3149 Other glass products manufacturing No No No 
3151 Sanitary ceramics manufacturing No No No 
3153 Daily ceramics manufacturing No No No 
3159 Gardening, furnishings and other ceramic products manufacturing No No No 
3161 Asbestos manufacturing No No No 
3162 Mica product manufacturing No No No 
3169 Refractory ceramics and other refractory materials manufacturing No No No 
3191 Graphite and carbon products manufacturing No No No 
3199 Other non-metallic mineral products manufacturing No No No 
3240 Ferroalloy smelting No No No 
3411 Metal structure manufacturing No No No 
3412 Metal door and window manufacturing No No No 
3421 Cutting tool manufacturing No No No 
3422 Hand tool manufacturing No No No 
3423 Metal tools for agricultural and garden use manufacturing No No No 
3424 Knives and scissors and similar daily metal tools manufacturing No No No 
3429 Other metal tool manufacturing No No No 
3431 Container manufacturing No No No 
3432 Metal pressure vessel manufacturing No No No 
3440 Wire rope and its products manufacturing No No No 
3452 Building decoration and plumbing pipe parts manufacturing No No No 
3453 Safety and fire metal products manufacturing No No No 
3459 Other construction and safety metal products manufacturing No No No 
3460 Metal surface treatment and heat treatment processing No No No 
3481 Metal kitchen conditioning and sanitary appliance manufacturing No No No 
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3482 Metal kitchen utensils and tableware manufacturing No No No 
3489 Other daily metal products manufacturing No No No 
3511 Boiler and auxiliary equipment manufacturing No No No 
3512 Internal combustion engine and accessories manufacturing No No No 
3514 Turbine and auxiliary machinery manufacturing No No No 
3519 Other prime mover manufacturing No No No 
3530 Lifting transport equipment manufacturing No No No 
3551 Bearing manufacturing No No No 
3552 Gear, transmission and drive component manufacturing No No No 
3560 Oven, furnace and electric furnace manufacturing No No No 
3571 Fan manufacturing No No No 
3573 Refrigeration and air conditioning equipment manufacturing No No No 
3574 Pneumatic and power tool manufacturing No No No 
3575 Spray guns and similar appliances manufacturing No No No 
3577 Weighing instrument manufacturing No No No 
3579 Other general equipment manufacturing No No No 
3582 Fasteners, spring manufacturing No No No 
3583 Mechanical parts processing and equipment repair No No No 
3589 Other general parts manufacturing No No No 
3591 Steel casting manufacturing No No No 
3592 Forgings and powder metallurgy products manufacturing No No No 
3611 Mining and quarrying equipment manufacturing No No No 
3612 Oil drilling and mining equipment manufacturing No No No 
3613 Construction machinery manufacturing No No No 
3614 Special machinery manufacturing for building materials production No No No 
3622 Rubber processing equipment manufacturing No No No 
3623 Plastic processing equipment manufacturing No No No 
3624 Wood processing machinery manufacturing No No No 
3625 Mold making No No No 
3631 Special equipment manufacturing for food, beverage and tobacco industry No No No 
3632 Manufacturing of special equipment for agricultural and sideline food processing No No No 
3633 Special equipment manufacturing for feed production No No No 
3642 Printing equipment manufacturing No No No 
3643 Daily use chemical equipment manufacturing No No No 
3644 Pharmaceutical special equipment manufacturing No No No 
3645 Special equipment for lighting equipment production manufacturing No No No 
3646 
Manufacture of special equipment for the production of glass, ceramics and 
enamel products 
No No No 
3661 Electrical machinery special equipment manufacturing No No No 
3669 Aviation, aerospace and other specialized equipment manufacturing No No No 
3681 Medical diagnostic, monitoring and treatment equipment manufacturing No No No 
3683 Laboratory and medical disinfection equipment and apparatus manufacturing No No No 
3684 Medical, surgical and veterinary equipment manufacturing No No No 
3686 Prosthetics, artificial organs and implants manufacturing No No No 
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3689 Other medical equipment manufacturing No No No 
3691 Special equipment for environmental pollution prevention and control No No No 
3692 Geological exploration special equipment manufacturing No No No 
3694 Manufacturing of special equipment for business, catering and service industries No No No 
3695 Social public safety related equipment manufacturing No No No 
3697 Water resources special machinery manufacturing No No No 
3699 Other special equipment manufacturing No No No 
3731 Motorcycle manufacturing No No No 
3732 Motorcycle parts and accessories manufacturing No No No 
3741 Bicycle and disabled wheelchair manufacturing No No No 
3951 Household refrigeration electric appliance manufacturing No No No 
3952 Household air conditioner manufacturing No No No 
3953 Household ventilation electrical appliance manufacturing No No No 
3954 Household kitchen appliances manufacturing No No No 
3955 Household cleaning and sanitary appliance manufacturing No No No 
3956 Home beauty, health care appliance manufacturing No No No 
3961 Manufacture of gas, solar and similar energy appliances No No No 
3969 Other non-power household appliances manufacturing No No No 
3971 Electric light source manufacturing No No No 
3972 Lighting fixture manufacturing No No No 
3979 Lamp electrical accessories and other lighting equipment manufacturing No No No 
3991 Vehicle-specific lighting and electrical signal equipment manufacturing No No No 
3999 Other unspecified electrical machinery manufacturing No No No 
4031 Radio and television program production and launch equipment manufacturing No No No 
4153 Camera and equipment manufacturing No No No 
4154 Copy and offset printing equipment manufacturing No No No 
4155 Calculator and currency equipment manufacturing No No No 
4159 Other cultural and office machinery manufacturing No No No 
4190 Other instruments manufacturing and repairs No No No 
4211 Sculpture crafts manufacturing No No No 
4212 Metal crafts manufacturing No No No 
4213 Lacquer crafts manufacturing No No No 
4214 Flower painting crafts manufacturing No No No 
4215 Natural plant weaving crafts manufacturing No No No 
4216 Drawn work embroidery crafts manufacturing No No No 
4217 Carpet and tapestries manufacturing No No No 
4218 Jewelry and related items manufacturing No No No 
4219 Other arts and crafts manufacturing No No No 
4221 Mirror and similar products processing No No No 
4222 Bristles, brushes and cleaning tools manufacturing No No No 
4229 Other daily sundries manufacturing No No No 
4219 Other arts and crafts manufacturing No No No 
4221 Mirror and similar products processing No No No 
4222 Bristles, brushes and cleaning tools manufacturing No No No 
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Dropped Group 1 - out of less than 10 observations in a single year 
2222 Handmade paper manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3673 Forest and wood bamboo cutting machinery manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3759 Navigation equipment and other floating devices manufacturing No Yes Yes 
4151 Film machinery manufacturing No No Yes 
4152 Slide and projection equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
1364 Fish oil extraction and product manufacturing No No Yes 
1491 Nutrition and health food manufacturing No No Yes 
2140 Plastic furniture manufacturing No No Yes 
3491 Laboratory supplies for coinage and precious metals manufacturing No No Yes 
3693 Special postal machinery and equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3792 Metal signage and facility for traffic menagement manufacturing No No Yes 
1369 Other aquatic products processing No No Yes 
1370 Vegetable, fruit and nut processing No No Yes 
1439 Instant noodles and other convenience food manufacturing No No Yes 
1534 Milk beverage and vegeprotein beverage manufacturing No No Yes 
1924 Leather gloves and leather decorative products manufacturing No No Yes 
2414 Ink manufacturing No No Yes 
2423 Training fitness equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
2424 Sports protective equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
2429 Other sporting goods manufacturing No No Yes 
2530 Nuclear fuel processing No No Yes 
2619 Other basic chemical raw material manufacturing No No Yes 
3132 Building ceramics manufacturing No No Yes 
3146 Glass insulation container manufacturing No No Yes 
3152 Special ceramics manufacturing No No Yes 
3321 Gold smelting No No Yes 
3322 Silver smelting No No Yes 
3329 Other precious metal smelting No No Yes 
3352 Precious metal calendering No No Yes 
3433 Metal packaging container manufacturing No No Yes 
3451 Manufacture of metal parts for construction and furniture No No Yes 
3471 Manufacture of enamel products for industrial production No No Yes 
3472 Enamel sanitary ware manufacturing No No Yes 
3479 Manufacture of enamel daily necessities and other enamel products No No Yes 
3499 Other unspecified metal products manufacturing No No Yes 
3572 Gas, liquid separation and pure equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3649 Manufacture of special equipment for the production of other daily necessities No No Yes 
3663 Weapons and ammunition manufacturing No No Yes 
3682 Dental equipment and equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3685 Mechanical treatment and ward care equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3696 Traffic safety and control special equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3742 Movable bicycle manufacturing No No Yes 
3791 Diving and underwater salvage equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
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3799 Other transportation equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
3957 Manufacture of accessories for household electrical appliances No No Yes 
3959 Other household electrical appliance manufacturing No No Yes 
4032 Radio and television receiving equipment manufacturing No No Yes 
4039 
Application of television equipment and other radio and television equipment 
manufacturing 
No No Yes 
4230 Coal product manufacturing No No Yes 
4240 Nuclear radiation processing No No Yes 
4290 Other unspecified manufacturing No No Yes 
4320 Non-metallic scrap and debris processing No No Yes 
1757 Nonwovens manufacturing No Yes Yes 
2239 Other paper products manufacturing No Yes Yes 
2740 Chinese medicine manufacturing No Yes Yes 
2750 Veterinary drugs manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3050 Plastic leather, synthetic leather manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3060 Plastic crates and containers manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3070 Plastic parts manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3081 Plastic shoes manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3651 Textile special equipment manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3652 Leather, fur and their products processing equipment manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3659 Other clothing processing special equipment manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3753 Recreational and sports ship manufacturing and repair No Yes Yes 
3762 Spacecraft manufacturing No Yes Yes 
3769 Other spacecraft manufacturing No Yes Yes 
Dropped Group 2 - out of supported by the 9th Five Year Plan 
2631 Chemical pesticide manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2632 Bio and microbial chemical pesticide manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2641 Paint manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2642 Ink and ink similar products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2643 Pigment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2644 Dye manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2645 Seal packing and similar products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2651 Primary form of plastic and synthetic resin manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2652 Synthetic rubber manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2653 Synthetic fiber monomer (polymer) manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2659 Other synthetic materials manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2661 Chemical reagents and additives manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2662 Special chemical products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2663 Forest chemical products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2664 Explosives and pyrotechnic products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2665 Information chemical manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2666 Special pharmaceutical materials for pollution treatment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2667 Animal glue manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2669 Other special chemical products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
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2671 Soap and synthetic detergent manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2672 Cosmetics manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2673 Oral cleaning supplies manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2674 Spices and fragrance manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2679 Other daily chemical products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2821 Nylon fiber manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2822 Polyester fiber manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2823 Acrylic fiber manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2824 Vinylon fiber manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2829 Other synthetic fibers manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3210 Ironmaking Yes Yes No 
3220 Steelmaking Yes Yes No 
3230 Steel calendaring Yes Yes No 
3316 Aluminum smelting Yes Yes No 
3331 Tungsten molybdenum smelting Yes Yes No 
3332 Rare earth metal smelting Yes Yes No 
3339 Other rare earth metal smelting Yes Yes No 
3521 Metal cutting machine tools manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3522 Metal forming machine manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3523 Casting machinery manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3524 Metal cutting and welding equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3525 Machine tool accessories manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3529 Other metal processing machinery manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3621 Refining, chemical production equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3721 Automobile vehicle manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3722 Car modification Yes Yes No 
3723 Tram manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3724 Car body and trailer manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3725 Auto parts and accessories manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3726 Car repair Yes Yes No 
3911 Generators and generator sets manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3912 Motor manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3919 Micro motor and other motor manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3921 Transformers, rectifiers and inductors manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3922 Capacitors and ancillary equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3923 Distribution switch control equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3924 Power electronic components manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3929 Other transmission and control equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3931 Wire and cable equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3932 Fiber optic cable manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3933 Insulating products manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3939 Other electrical equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
3940 Battery manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4041 Electronic computer manufacturing Yes Yes No 
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4042 Computer network equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4043 External equipment for electronic computer manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4051 Electronic vacuum devices manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4052 Semiconductor discrete devices manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4053 Integrated circuit manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4059 Optoelectronic and other electronic devices manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4061 Electronic components manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4062 Printed circuit board manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4111 Industrial automatic control system manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4112 Electrical instrumentation manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4113 Drawing, calculation and measurement equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4114 Experimental analysis equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4115 Testing machine manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4119 Instruments and other general equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4121 Special instrument for environmental monitoring manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4122 Counting instrument for car and others manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4123 Navigation, meteorological and marine special equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4124 Special instrumentation for agriculture manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4125 Geological exploration and seismic equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4126 Teaching special equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4127 Nuclear and nuclear radiation measuring instruments manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4128 Electronic measuring instruments manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4129 Other special equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4130 Watches and clock equipment manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4141 Optical instruments manufacturing Yes Yes No 
4142 Glasses manufacturing Yes Yes No 
2511 Crude oil processing and petroleum products manufacturing Yes No No 
2512 Artificial crude oil manufacturing Yes No No 
2520 Coking Yes No No 
3311 Copper smelting Yes No No 
3312 Lead and zinc smelting Yes No No 
3313 Nickel and cobalt smelting Yes No No 
3314 Tin smelting Yes No No 
3315 Antimony smelting Yes No No 
3317 Magnesium smelting Yes No No 
3319 Other commonly used non-ferrous metal smelting Yes No No 
3340 Non-ferrous metal alloy manufacturing Yes No No 
3351 Common non-ferrous metal rolling processing Yes No No 
3353 Rare earth metal rolling processing Yes No No 
3541 Pump and vacuum equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
3542 Gas compression machinery manufacturing Yes No No 
3543 Valves and cocks manufacturing Yes No No 
3544 Hydraulic and pneumatic power machinery and component manufacturing Yes No No 
3576 Packing equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
121 
 
3581 Metal seal manufacturing Yes No No 
3629 Other non-metal processing equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
3662 Special equipment for electronics manufacturing Yes No No 
4011 Communication transmission equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4012 Communication switching equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4013 Communication terminal equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4014 Mobile communication and terminal equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4019 Other communication equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4020 Radar and ancillary equipment manufacturing Yes No No 
4310 Metal scrap and debris manufacturing Yes No No 
Note: There are 482 industries in total, of which 117 are supported by the 9th Five Year Plan and 365 are not. 
Moreover, 66 industries have less than 10 firms in a single year, so there are 299 industries in the sample, of which 
there are 88 industries that are supported by the 10th Five Year Plan and 211 are not. 
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Table A.1.2: Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on the Dispersions of TFPR 
Notes: V(TFPR) denotes the variance of log(TFPR). Post2000 is the period dummy that takes the value one if the 
year is after 2000. Supported is a dummy that takes one if the industry is supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. 
Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) and Mean (SOE share) denote the industry’s average age, export/value-added and 
state-owned enterprise share, respectively. WLS regressions are weighted by the industry’s share of value-added. 
The number of industry-year observations in all regressions is 2,392. Standard errors clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** 
and *, respectively 
 
  OLS WLS 
Variables V(TFPR) 90th -10th 75th -25th V(TFPR) 90th -10th 75th -25th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.0124* .01008 .01582* 0.000392 -.0098 .00083 
 (0.00641) .01464 .00895 (0.0106) .0252 .01601 
Supported -0.0138 -.03707 -.03542 -0.0294 -.06602 -.0415 
 (0.0255) .05876 .03186 (0.0457) .10327 .05314 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0280** .06955** .04361*** 0.0649*** .14952*** .09537 
 (0.0120) .02849 .01676 (0.0171) .03928 .02453 
Constant 0.422*** 1.5807*** .78658*** 0.449*** 1.6307*** .80446 
 (0.0144) .0315 .0172 (0.0228) .05286 .02641 
R-squared 0.003 0.0017 0.0038 0.009 0.0088 0.0145 
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Table A.1.3: Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on the Dispersion of TFPR, Controlling 
for the Variance of Firms’ Characteristics 
  OLS   WLS  
VARIABLES V(TFPR) 90th -10th  75th -25th V(TFPR) 90th -10th  75th -25th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 
0.0513*** 0.0929*** 0.0455*** 0.0663** 0.130** 0.0594* 
(0.0136) (0.0298) (0.0165) (0.0287) (0.0634) (0.0336) 
Supported 
-0.0189 -0.0482 -0.0388 -0.0461 -0.104 -0.0610 
(0.0241) (0.0554) (0.0303) (0.0412) (0.0939) (0.0501) 
Post2000× 
Supported 
0.0328** 0.0819*** 0.0506*** 0.0860*** 0.196*** 0.115*** 
(0.0130) (0.0299) (0.0176) (0.0260) (0.0575) (0.0317) 
V(Age) 
-0.000272*** -0.000690*** -0.000422*** -0.000220* -0.000506* -0.000323** 
(8.80e-05) (0.000198) (0.000106) (0.000120) (0.000305) (0.000150) 
V(Export/VA) 
-8.23e-07*** -2.62e-06*** -1.32e-06*** -8.61e-07*** -2.70e-06*** -1.38e-06*** 
(1.92e-07) (4.71e-07) (2.27e-07) (2.82e-07) (6.74e-07) (3.50e-07) 
V(SOE share) 
0.722*** 1.625*** 0.707*** 1.194*** 2.583*** 1.150*** 
(0.165) (0.376) (0.197) (0.276) (0.647) (0.347) 
Constant 
0.362*** 1.462*** 0.757*** 0.319*** 1.359*** 0.705*** 
(0.0240) (0.0532) (0.0289) (0.0403) (0.0920) (0.0496) 
R-squared 0.032 0.034 0.030 0.082 0.079 0.060 
Notes: V(TFPR) denotes the variance of log(TFPR). 90th -10th and 75th -25th denote the difference in log(TFPR) 
values between the 90th and the 10th percentile and between the 75th and the 25th percentile, respectively. Post2000 is 
the period dummy that takes the value one if the year is after 2000. Supported is a dummy that takes one if the industry 
is supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) and Mean (SOE share) denote industry’s 
average age, export/value-added and state-owned enterprise share, respectively. WLS regressions are weighted by 
the industry’s share of value-added. The number of industry-year observations in all regressions is 2,392. Standard 
errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively 
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Table A.1.4: Anticipated Effects of the 10th Five Year Plan on the Variance of TFPR 
 OLS WLS 
Variables V(TFPR) V(TFPR) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supported × 1999 -.000369 0.000468 -.000135 -0.0426 -0.0445 -0.0438 
 (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0386) (0.0393) (0.0390) 
Supported × 2000 0.0164 0.0168 0.0175 0.00248 -0.000845 0.000265 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0332) 
Post2000×Supported 0.0333** 0.0310* 0.0333** 0.0327 0.0201 0.0266 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0238) (0.0267) (0.0250) 
Mean(Age)  -0.0038**   -0.00418  
  (0.00188)   (0.00277)  
Mean(Export/VA)  -0.00128   -0.00161  
  (0.00138)   (0.00169)  
Mean(SOE share)  -0.0502   -0.153  
  (0.0810)   (0.135)  
V(Age)   3.84e-05   0.000264** 
   (7.91e-05)   (0.000117) 
V(Export/VA)   -2.3e-7***   -3.1e-7*** 
   (3.65e-08)   (7.62e-08) 
V(SOE share)   -0.198   -0.519*** 
   (0.123)   (0.152) 
Constant 0.858*** 0.950*** 0.894*** 0.850*** 0.996*** 0.897*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0328) (0.0315) (0.0177) (0.0473) (0.0386) 
R-squared 0.856 0.858 0.857 0.904 0.907 0.906 
Notes: V(TFPR) denotes the variance of log(TFPR). WLS regressions are weighted by the industry’s share of 
value-added. Post2000 is the period dummy that takes the value one if the year is after 2000. Supported is a 
dummy that takes one if the industry is supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) 
and Mean (SOE share) denote industry’s average age, export/value-added and state-owned enterprise share 
respectively. V (Age), V (Export/VA) and V (SOE share) denote industry’s variance of age, export/value-added 
and state-owned enterprise share, respectively. In all regressions, policy change dummies 1999 to 2000 are equal 
to one in only 1 year each per supported industry. Supported × Post2000 dummy is equal to one in every year 
after the issue of the Five Year Plan. The year 1998 is omitted. The number of industry-year observations in all 
regressions is 2,392. Standard errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table A.1.5: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Mean of TFPR and TFPQ  
Notes: M (TFPR) and M(TFPQ) denote the mean of log(TFPR) and log(TFPQ), respectively. Post2000 is the period 
dummy that takes the value one if the year is after 2000. Supported is a dummy that takes one if the industry is 
supported by the 10th Five Year Plan. Mean (Age), Mean (Export/VA) and Mean (SOE share) denote industry’s 
average age, export/value-added and state-owned enterprise share, respectively. WLS regressions are weighted by 
the industry’s share of value-added. The number of industry-year observations in all regressions is 2,392. Standard 
errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively 
 
 
 
  OLS WLS 
Variables M(TFPR) M(TFPQ) M(TFPR) M(TFPQ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post2000 0.111*** 0.274*** 0.129*** 0.323*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0215) (0.0595) 
Supported -0.0630 0.0200 -0.181 -0.310 
 (0.0398) (0.0492) (0.134) (0.318) 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0519** 0.0385 0.0730** -0.00191 
 (0.0204) (0.0261) (0.0359) (0.0686) 
Constant 1.619*** 5.694*** 1.752*** 6.150*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0298) (0.122) (0.312) 
R-squared 0.031 0.080 0.053 0.061 
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Table A.1.6: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Taxes, Subsidies and Interest Payments 
Variables Tax 
Dummy 
Tax/Value-
added 
Subsidy 
Dummy 
Subsidy/Value-
added 
Interest 
Payment 
Interest/Debt 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Ordered probit OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.113*** -0.00331 0.203*** 0.185*** -0.204*** -0.00609* 
 (0.0176) (0.00267) (0.0153) (0.0220) (0.0135) (0.00347) 
Supported -0.185** -0.0309*** 0.0464 0.0393 0.125* -0.000441 
 (0.0762) (0.00947) (0.0445) (0.0429) (0.0648) (0.00359) 
Post2000 × 
Supported 
0.0747** 0.0135*** 0.0259 0.0297 -0.0368 0.0153 
(0.0304) (0.00437) (0.0352) (0.0367) (0.0246) (0.0116) 
Age 0.0124*** 0.000798*** 0.00678*** 0.00681*** 0.0121*** -0.000218* 
 (0.00145) (0.000195) (0.000773) (0.000824) (0.000691) (0.000111) 
Export -0.601*** -0.0595*** 0.282*** 0.224*** -0.134*** -0.0218*** 
 (0.0452) (0.00726) (0.0366) (0.0474) (0.0295) (0.00757) 
State-owned -0.0548 0.0118* 0.205*** 0.257*** -0.205*** -0.0287*** 
 (0.0597) (0.00666) (0.0326) (0.0384) (0.0398) (0.00495) 
Constant 0.818*** 0.00968 -1.535*** -1.772***   
 (0.0324) (0.00756) (0.0212) (0.173)   
Cut-point 1     -1.538***  
     (0.0240)  
Cut-point 2     -0.493***  
     (0.0223)  
Sigma  0.235***  1.113***   
  (0.0304)  (0.105)   
Observations 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Notes: The tax dummy equals 1 if a firm pays taxes, 0 otherwise. The subsidy dummy equals 1 if a firm receives 
subsidies, 0 otherwise. Interest Payment takes the value of 1 if the firm receives interest payments, 2 if it does not 
receive nor pay interests, and 2 if it pays interests. Interests/Debt is the ratio of a firm’s interest payment to total 
liabilities. Export is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm exports, 0 otherwise. State-owned is a dummy that equals to 1 
if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
 
Table A.1.7: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Taxes, Subsidies and Interest Payments 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Ordered Probit OLS 
VARIABLES Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added Applied Interest Rate Dummy Applied Interest Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post2000×Supported .0642*** .0642*** .00755*** 0.00755*** 0.0563 0.0563*** 0.0561 0.0561*** -0.0144** -0.0144 .0198 .0198 
 (0.00670) (0.0229) (0.00113) (0.00266) (.0405) (.00789) (.0398) (.00878) (.00605) (0.0213) (.01459) (.01358) 
Age .0103*** .0103*** .000516*** .000516*** .00662*** .00662*** .00663*** .00663*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** -.0002 -.0002 
 (.00016) (.00107) (2.36e-05) (.000107) (.000472) (.000155) (.000679) (.000171) (.000136) (.000659) (.00031) (.00010) 
Export Dummy -0.585*** -0.585*** -0.0538*** -0.0538*** 0.367*** 0.367*** 0.304*** 0.304*** -0.0260*** -0.0260* -.0168** -.0168** 
 (0.00363) (0.0275) (.000643) (.00632) (0.0184) (0.00420) (0.0333) (.00474) (0.00327) (0.0156) (.0082) (.0057) 
Ownership 0.00391 0.00391 .00903*** .00903** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.237*** 0.237*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -.0364*** -.0364*** 
 (.00586) (.0464) (.00091) (.00382) (0.0220) (0.00605) (0.0301) (.00664) (0.00495) (0.0271) (.01196) (.00902) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.240*** -0.0452*** -0.0452*** -1.903*** -3.411*** -2.120*** -1.903*** -1.903*** -1.903*** .2147*** .2147*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0258) (0.00216) (0.0107) (0.0290) (0.0344) (0.199) (0.0168) (0.0119) (0.0176) (.02759) (.00629) 
Sigma   0.232*** 0.232***   1.108*** 1.108*** -0.829*** -0.829***   
   (0.000198) (0.0306)   (0.106) (0.00244) (0.0118) (0.0162)   
Observations 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 902,175 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster No Industry No Industry No Industry No Industry No Industry No Industry 
Notes: Tax dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays tax, otherwise 0. Subsidy dummy equals to 1 if a firm receives subsidy, otherwise 0. Applied interest rate is measured with firm’s interest payment 
divided by total liability. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.1.8: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Tax Payments 
 Bottom tier Middle tier Top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
VARIABLES Tax 
Dummy 
Tax/Value-
added 
Tax 
Dummy 
Tax/Value-
added 
Tax 
Dummy 
Tax/Value-
added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.0989*** 0.00186 0.0876*** -.00562*** 0.0850*** -.0069*** 
 (0.0194) (0.00589) (0.0207) (0.00158) (0.0196) (0.00127) 
Supported -0.168* -0.0484*** -0.195** -0.0219*** -0.202*** -0.0188*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0177) (0.0808) (0.00752) (0.0683) (0.00572) 
Post2000 × Supported 0.0871** 0.0226*** 0.0733** 0.00885*** 0.0448 0.00740*** 
 (0.0384) (0.00859) (0.0356) (0.00334) (0.0323) (0.00253) 
Age 0.0162*** 0.00201*** 0.0145*** 0.000402** 0.00811*** 0.000272 
 (0.00150) (0.000363) (0.00175) (0.000203) (0.00154) (0.000177) 
Export Dummy -0.724*** -0.150*** -0.587*** -0.0322*** -0.476*** -0.0201*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0199) (0.0505) (0.00497) (0.0442) (0.00284) 
Ownership 0.0186 0.0249*** -0.0185 0.00554 -0.127* 0.00457 
 (0.0534) (0.00834) (0.0667) (0.00582) (0.0663) (0.00745) 
Constant 0.598*** -0.0377** 0.858*** 0.0295*** 0.981*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0188) (0.0390) (0.00367) (0.0286) (0.00290) 
Sigma  0.435***  0.108***  0.0891*** 
  (0.0630)  (0.0151)  (0.00835) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Notes: Tax dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays tax, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. 
Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.1.9: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Subsidies 
 Bottom tier Middle tier Top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
VARIABLE
S 
Subsidy 
Dummy 
Subsidy/Value
-added 
Subsidy 
Dummy 
Subsidy/Value
-added 
Subsidy 
Dummy 
Subsidy/Value
-added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 0.199*** 0.286*** 0.218*** 0.126*** 0.233*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0417) (0.0172) (0.0370) (0.0191) (0.00715) 
Supported 0.0297 0.0366 0.0513 0.0270 0.0646 0.0195 
 (0.0477) (0.0726) (0.0488) (0.0312) (0.0426) (0.0120) 
Post2000 × 
Supported 
0.0725 0.116 0.0462 0.0350 -0.00991 -0.00433 
(0.0461) (0.0722) (0.0411) (0.0279) (0.0305) (0.00964) 
Age 0.00660**
* 
0.0106*** 
0.00616**
* 
0.00375*** 
0.00599**
* 
0.00161*** 
 (0.000639) (0.00121) (0.000891) (0.00109) (0.000896) (0.000283) 
Export 
Dummy 
0.222*** 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.133*** 0.301*** 0.0549*** 
(0.0399) (0.0718) (0.0369) (0.0507) (0.0336) (0.0120) 
Ownership 0.170*** 0.367*** 0.169*** 0.121*** 0.225*** 0.0693*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0606) (0.0342) (0.0362) (0.0389) (0.0100) 
Constant -1.423*** -2.668*** -1.473*** -1.073*** -1.682*** -0.479*** 
 (0.0249) (0.276) (0.0226) (0.309) (0.0268) (0.0453) 
Sigma  1.790***  0.704***  0.283*** 
  (0.177)  (0.197)  (0.0260) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Notes: Subsidy dummy equals to 1 if a firm receives subsidy, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has 
exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.1.10: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Interest Payments 
 Bottom tier Middle tier Top tier 
 Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Variables Interest 
Payments 
Interests/Debt 
Interest 
Payments 
Interests/Debt 
Interest 
Payments 
Interests/Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post2000 -0.174*** -0.00778* -0.193*** -0.0105*** -0.238*** -0.00473 
 (0.0154) (0.00455) (0.0150) (0.00377) (0.0160) (0.00647) 
Supported 0.129* 0.000225 0.134* -0.000938 0.114** 9.53e-05 
 (0.0720) (0.00467) (0.0686) (0.00471) (0.0554) (0.00535) 
Post2000 × 
Supported 
-0.0115 0.000147 -0.0189 0.0104 -0.0505 0.0234 
(0.0272) (0.00461) (0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0341) (0.0223) 
Age 0.0119*** -4.28e-05 0.0108*** -0.000519*** 0.0128*** 0.000129 
 (0.000635) (5.69e-05) (0.000742) (0.000126) (0.000839) (0.000319) 
Export Dummy -0.200*** -0.0132*** -0.102*** -0.0198*** -0.116*** -0.0247 
 (0.0373) (0.00255) (0.0322) (0.00650) (0.0255) (0.0175) 
Ownership -0.157*** -0.0116*** -0.185*** -0.0188*** -0.297*** -0.0496*** 
 (0.0365) (0.00221) (0.0437) (0.00308) (0.0438) (0.0120) 
Cut point 1 -1.449***  -1.508***  -1.639***  
 (0.0257)  (0.0271)  (0.0244)  
Cut point 2 -0.507***  -0.547***  -0.457***  
 (0.0256)  (0.0242)  (0.0220)  
Constant  0.0378***  0.0601***  0.0710*** 
  (0.00597)  (0.00684)  (0.00504) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Notes: Applied interest rate is measured with firm’s interest payment divided by total liability. Applied interest rate 
D is a dummy variable with 1, 2, and 3, corresponding to whether a firm pays negative, zero and positive interest 
rate. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals 
to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1.11: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Tax Payments 
 TFPR bottom tier TFPR middle tier TFPR top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
VARIABLES Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added Tax Dummy Tax/Value-added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post2000×Supported 0.0683*** 0.0683** 0.0107*** 0.0107* 0.0676*** 0.0676** .00350*** .00350** 0.0385*** 0.0385 .00425*** .00425*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0275) (0.00393) (0.00575) (0.0121) (0.0292) (0.000850) (0.00166) (0.0115) (0.0256) (0.000666) (0.00149) 
Age 0.0144*** 0.0144*** .00163*** .00163*** 0.0118*** .0118*** .00015*** .00015** .00591*** .00591*** 2.61e-05* 2.61e-05 
 (0.000273) (0.00109) (7.70e-05) (0.000291) (0.000292) (0.0014) (1.75e-05) (6.98e-05) (0.000277) (0.00122) (1.47e-05) (6.50e-05) 
Export Dummy -0.684*** -0.684*** -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.569*** -.569*** -0.0269*** -0.0269*** -0.454*** -0.454*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** 
 (0.00653) (0.0277) (0.00229) (0.0182) (0.00663) (0.0289) (0.000489) (0.00255) (0.00602) (0.0248) (0.000365) (0.00124) 
Ownership 0.0747*** 0.0747** 0.0263*** 0.0263*** 0.0486*** 0.0486 0.00104 0.00104 -0.0792*** -0.0792 -.00286*** -0.00286 
 (0.00953) (0.0341) (0.00285) (0.00564) (0.0109) (0.0539) (0.000689) (0.00237) (0.0106) (0.0562) (0.000587) (0.00225) 
Constant -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.168*** -0.168*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.00145 0.00145 0.478*** 0.478*** .0119*** .0119*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0273) (0.00803) (0.0303) (.0207) (.0360) (.00161) (.00488) (.0191) (.0237) (.00119) (.00256) 
Sigma   0.431*** 0.431***   .0995*** .0995***   0.0828*** 0.0828*** 
   (0.00073) (0.0634)   (.000152) (.0133)   (.000109) (.00653) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 368,188 368,188 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Tax dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays tax, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-
owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.1.12: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Subsidies 
 TFPR bottom tier TFPR middle tier TFPR top tier 
 Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
VARIABLES Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added Subsidy Dummy Subsidy/Value-added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post2000×Supported 0.0877*** 0.0877** 0.135*** 0.135** 0.0795*** 0.0795* 0.0536*** 0.0536* 0.0291** 0.0291 0.00777* 0.00777 
 (0.0137) (0.0439) (0.0243) (0.0666) (0.0135) (0.0437) (0.00945) (0.0294) (0.0145) (0.0383) (0.00401) (0.0119) 
Age .00674*** .00674*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.00575*** .00575*** .00336*** .00336*** .00553*** .00553*** .00144*** .00144*** 
 (0.000260) (0.000467) (0.000458) (0.00115) (0.000265) (0.000580) (0.000184) (0.000922) (0.000291) (0.000548) (8.01e-05) (0.000193) 
Export Dummy 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.367*** 0.367*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.00756) (0.0228) (0.0136) (0.0504) (0.00731) (0.0186) (0.00516) (0.0553) (0.00718) (0.0194) (0.00203) (0.00869) 
Ownership 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.0551*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.00983) (0.0215) (0.0173) (0.0462) (0.0106) (0.0236) (0.00732) (0.0285) (0.0117) (0.0267) (0.00318) (0.00829) 
Constant -1.678*** -1.678*** -3.043*** -3.043*** -1.926*** -1.926*** -1.336*** -1.336*** -2.058*** -2.058*** -0.564*** -0.564*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0311) (0.0522) (0.304) (0.0295) (0.0348) (0.0213) (0.379) (0.0300) (0.0269) (0.00855) (0.0542) 
Sigma   1.780*** 1.780***   0.697*** 0.697***   0.279*** 0.279*** 
   (0.00687) (0.177)   (0.0026) (0.197)   (0.00115) (0.0258) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 368,188 368,188 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Subsidy dummy equals to 1 if a firm receives subsidy, otherwise 0. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a 
firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.1.13: Effects of the Five Year Plan on Interest Payments 
 TFPR bottom tier TFPR middle tier TFPR top tier 
 Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit OLS 
VARIABLES Applied interest rate D Applied interest rate Applied interest rate D Applied interest rate Applied interest rate D Applied interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post2000×Supported -0.00605 -0.00605 -0.000799 -0.000799 0.00636 0.00636 0.0154 0.0154 -0.0238** -0.0238 0.0286 0.0286 
 (0.0110) (0.0229) (0.00427) (0.00372) (0.0108) (0.0238) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0100) (0.0239) (0.0353) (0.0250) 
Age 0.0111*** 0.0111*** -1.87e-05 -1.87e-05 0.00969*** .00969*** -0.000589 -0.000589*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 4.96e-05 4.96e-05 
 (0.000241) (0.000589) (8.71e-05) (5.48e-05) (0.000241) (0.000739) (0.000361) (0.000225) (0.000231) (0.000794) (0.000788) (0.000272) 
Export Dummy -.0985*** -.0985*** -.0116*** -.0116*** -0.00298 -0.00298 -0.0174* -0.0174*** 0.00545 0.00545 -0.0147 -0.0147 
 (0.00611) (0.0233) (0.00244) (0.00241) (0.00595) (0.0174) (0.00978) (0.00512) (0.00519) (0.0120) (0.0192) (0.0144) 
Ownership -0.176*** -0.176*** -.0138*** -.0138*** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.0259* -0.0259*** -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.0609* -.0609*** 
 (0.00842) (0.0248) (0.00321) (0.00328) (0.00895) (0.0297) (0.0141) (0.00687) (0.00868) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0206) 
Cut-point 1 -1.691*** -1.691***   -1.883*** -1.883***   -2.076*** -2.076***   
 (0.0230) (0.0218)   (0.0213) (0.0225)   (0.0187) (0.0214)   
Cut-point 2 -0.721*** -0.721***   -0.894*** -0.894***   -0.858*** -0.858***   
 (0.0228) (0.0207)   (0.0211) (0.0190)   (0.0185) (0.0157)   
Constant   0.0608*** 0.0608***   0.108*** 0.108***   0.393*** 0.392*** 
   (0.0086) (0.00142)   (0.0321) (0.00812)   (0.0631) (0.0155) 
Observations 252,202 252,202 252,202 252,202 281,785 281,785 281,785 281,785 368,188 368,188 368,188 368,188 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Applied interest rate is measured with firm’s interest payment divided by total liability. Applied interest rate D is a dummy variable with 1, 2, and 3, corresponding to whether a firm pays 
negative, zero and positive interest rate. Export dummy equal to 1 if a firm has exports. Ownership is measured with a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm is state-owned, otherwise 0. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A.1.1. Un-normalized Mean and Variance of TFPR and TFPQ 
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